GHSA-5CW2-54CW-VCC9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-18 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-06 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for TTM_TT_FLAG_PRIV_POPULATED
Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/drm/ttm/ttm_tt.h:122:26 left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c ttm_bo_move_memcpy+0x3b4/0x460 [ttm] bo_driver_move+0x32/0x40 [drm_vram_helper] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0x118/0x200 [ttm] ttm_bo_validate+0xfa/0x220 [ttm] drm_gem_vram_pin_locked+0x70/0x1b0 [drm_vram_helper] drm_gem_vram_pin+0x48/0xb0 [drm_vram_helper] drm_gem_vram_plane_helper_prepare_fb+0x53/0xe0 [drm_vram_helper] drm_gem_vram_simple_display_pipe_prepare_fb+0x26/0x30 [drm_vram_helper] drm_simple_kms_plane_prepare_fb+0x4d/0xe0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0xda/0x210 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0xc3/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0x9c/0x160 [drm] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x33a/0x380 [drm] drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x77/0x220 [drm] drm_client_modeset_commit+0x31/0x60 [drm] __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0xa7/0x170 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x51/0x90 [drm_kms_helper] fbcon_init+0x316/0x790 visual_init+0x113/0x1d0 do_bind_con_driver+0x2a3/0x5c0 do_take_over_console+0xa9/0x270 do_fbcon_takeover+0xa1/0x170 do_fb_registered+0x2a8/0x340 fbcon_fb_registered+0x47/0xe0 register_framebuffer+0x294/0x4a0 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x43c/0x880 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x52/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x156/0x1b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fbdev_generic_setup+0xfc/0x290 [drm_kms_helper] bochs_pci_probe+0x6ca/0x772 [bochs] local_pci_probe+0x4d/0xb0 pci_device_probe+0x119/0x320 really_probe+0x181/0x550 __driver_probe_device+0xc6/0x220 driver_probe_device+0x32/0x100 __driver_attach+0x195/0x200 bus_for_each_dev+0xbb/0x120 driver_attach+0x27/0x30 bus_add_driver+0x22e/0x2f0 driver_register+0xa9/0x190 __pci_register_driver+0x90/0xa0 bochs_pci_driver_init+0x52/0x1000 [bochs] do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430 do_init_module+0x61/0x28a load_module+0x1f82/0x2e50 __do_sys_finit_module+0xf8/0x190 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x23/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50390"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-18T14:15:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/ttm: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for TTM_TT_FLAG_PRIV_POPULATED\n\nShifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing\nsignificant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:\n\nUBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/drm/ttm/ttm_tt.h:122:26\nleft shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type \u0027int\u0027\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5\n dump_stack+0x15/0x1b\n ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e\n __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c\n ttm_bo_move_memcpy+0x3b4/0x460 [ttm]\n bo_driver_move+0x32/0x40 [drm_vram_helper]\n ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0x118/0x200 [ttm]\n ttm_bo_validate+0xfa/0x220 [ttm]\n drm_gem_vram_pin_locked+0x70/0x1b0 [drm_vram_helper]\n drm_gem_vram_pin+0x48/0xb0 [drm_vram_helper]\n drm_gem_vram_plane_helper_prepare_fb+0x53/0xe0 [drm_vram_helper]\n drm_gem_vram_simple_display_pipe_prepare_fb+0x26/0x30 [drm_vram_helper]\n drm_simple_kms_plane_prepare_fb+0x4d/0xe0 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0xda/0x210 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_atomic_helper_commit+0xc3/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_atomic_commit+0x9c/0x160 [drm]\n drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x33a/0x380 [drm]\n drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x77/0x220 [drm]\n drm_client_modeset_commit+0x31/0x60 [drm]\n __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0xa7/0x170 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x51/0x90 [drm_kms_helper]\n fbcon_init+0x316/0x790\n visual_init+0x113/0x1d0\n do_bind_con_driver+0x2a3/0x5c0\n do_take_over_console+0xa9/0x270\n do_fbcon_takeover+0xa1/0x170\n do_fb_registered+0x2a8/0x340\n fbcon_fb_registered+0x47/0xe0\n register_framebuffer+0x294/0x4a0\n __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x43c/0x880 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x52/0x80 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x156/0x1b0 [drm_kms_helper]\n drm_fbdev_generic_setup+0xfc/0x290 [drm_kms_helper]\n bochs_pci_probe+0x6ca/0x772 [bochs]\n local_pci_probe+0x4d/0xb0\n pci_device_probe+0x119/0x320\n really_probe+0x181/0x550\n __driver_probe_device+0xc6/0x220\n driver_probe_device+0x32/0x100\n __driver_attach+0x195/0x200\n bus_for_each_dev+0xbb/0x120\n driver_attach+0x27/0x30\n bus_add_driver+0x22e/0x2f0\n driver_register+0xa9/0x190\n __pci_register_driver+0x90/0xa0\n bochs_pci_driver_init+0x52/0x1000 [bochs]\n do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430\n do_init_module+0x61/0x28a\n load_module+0x1f82/0x2e50\n __do_sys_finit_module+0xf8/0x190\n __x64_sys_finit_module+0x23/0x30\n do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-5cw2-54cw-vcc9",
"modified": "2026-02-06T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-09-18T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ff0309b73d86e8591881ac035af06e01c112e89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/387659939c00156f8d6bab0fbc55b4eaf2b6bc5b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6528971fdce0dfc0a28fec42c151a1eccdabadf5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4079a34c0adef9f35a16783fb13a9084406f96d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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