GHSA-5CVR-QR2R-C7RM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-01 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-07 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: explicitly disallow disconnect
syzbot discovered that it can disconnect a TLS socket and then run into all sort of unexpected corner cases. I have a vague recollection of Eric pointing this out to us a long time ago. Supporting disconnect is really hard, for one thing if offload is enabled we'd need to wait for all packets to be acked. Disconnect is not commonly used, disallow it.
The immediate problem syzbot run into is the warning in the strp, but that's just the easiest bug to trigger:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5834 at net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 tls_strp_msg_load+0x72e/0xa80 net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 RIP: 0010:tls_strp_msg_load+0x72e/0xa80 net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 Call Trace: tls_rx_rec_wait+0x280/0xa60 net/tls/tls_sw.c:1363 tls_sw_recvmsg+0x85c/0x1c30 net/tls/tls_sw.c:2043 inet6_recvmsg+0x2c9/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:678 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1023 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1045 __sys_recvfrom+0x202/0x380 net/socket.c:2237
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-37756"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T13:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: tls: explicitly disallow disconnect\n\nsyzbot discovered that it can disconnect a TLS socket and then\nrun into all sort of unexpected corner cases. I have a vague\nrecollection of Eric pointing this out to us a long time ago.\nSupporting disconnect is really hard, for one thing if offload\nis enabled we\u0027d need to wait for all packets to be _acked_.\nDisconnect is not commonly used, disallow it.\n\nThe immediate problem syzbot run into is the warning in the strp,\nbut that\u0027s just the easiest bug to trigger:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5834 at net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 tls_strp_msg_load+0x72e/0xa80 net/tls/tls_strp.c:486\n RIP: 0010:tls_strp_msg_load+0x72e/0xa80 net/tls/tls_strp.c:486\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n tls_rx_rec_wait+0x280/0xa60 net/tls/tls_sw.c:1363\n tls_sw_recvmsg+0x85c/0x1c30 net/tls/tls_sw.c:2043\n inet6_recvmsg+0x2c9/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:678\n sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1023 [inline]\n sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1045\n __sys_recvfrom+0x202/0x380 net/socket.c:2237",
"id": "GHSA-5cvr-qr2r-c7rm",
"modified": "2026-05-07T09:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-05-01T15:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2bcad8fefcecdd5f005d8c550b25d703c063c34a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5071a1e606b30c0c11278d3c6620cd6a24724cf6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bdcf5bc35ae59fc4a0fa23276e84b4d1534a3cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8513411ec321942bd3cfed53d5bb700665c67d86"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fcbca0f801580cbb583e9cb274e2c7fbe766ca6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac91c6125468be720eafde9c973994cb45b61d44"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c665bef891e8972e1d3ce5bbc0d42a373346a2c3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3ce4d3f874ab7919edca364c147ac735f9f1d04"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00030.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00045.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/07/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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