GHSA-58JC-RCG5-95F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-26 17:30 – Updated: 2025-12-27 01:08Summary
A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability may occur in n8n when using the “Respond to Webhook” node. When this node responds with HTML content containing executable scripts, the payload may execute directly in the top-level window, rather than within the expected sandbox introduced in version 1.103.0.
This behavior can enable a malicious actor with workflow creation permissions to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the n8n editor interface.
While session cookies (n8n-auth) are marked HttpOnly and cannot be directly exfiltrated, the vulnerability can facilitate Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)-like actions from within the user’s authenticated session, potentially allowing:
- Unauthorized reading of sensitive workflow data or execution history.
- Unauthorized modification or deletion of workflows.
- Insertion of malicious workflow logic or external data exfiltration steps.
n8n instances that allow untrusted users to create workflows are particularly impacted.
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in v.1.114.0.
Workarounds
- Restrict workflow creation and modification privileges to trusted users only.
- Avoid using untrusted HTML responses in the “Respond to Webhook” node.
- Use an external reverse proxy or HTML sanitizer to filter responses that include executable scripts.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.114.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-61914"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-26T17:30:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-26T22:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability may occur in n8n when using the \u201cRespond to Webhook\u201d node.\nWhen this node responds with HTML content containing executable scripts, the payload may execute directly in the top-level window, rather than within the expected sandbox introduced in version 1.103.0.\n\nThis behavior can enable a malicious actor with workflow creation permissions to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the n8n editor interface.\n\nWhile session cookies (`n8n-auth`) are marked `HttpOnly` and cannot be directly exfiltrated, the vulnerability can facilitate Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)-like actions from within the user\u2019s authenticated session, potentially allowing:\n\n- Unauthorized reading of sensitive workflow data or execution history.\n- Unauthorized modification or deletion of workflows.\n- Insertion of malicious workflow logic or external data exfiltration steps.\n\nn8n instances that allow untrusted users to create workflows are particularly impacted.\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patched in v.1.114.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n- Restrict workflow creation and modification privileges to trusted users only.\n- Avoid using untrusted HTML responses in the \u201cRespond to Webhook\u201d node.\n- Use an external reverse proxy or HTML sanitizer to filter responses that include executable scripts.",
"id": "GHSA-58jc-rcg5-95f3",
"modified": "2025-12-27T01:08:11Z",
"published": "2025-12-26T17:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-58jc-rcg5-95f3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61914"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "n8n\u0027s Possible Stored XSS in \"Respond to Webhook\" Node May Execute Outside iframe Sandbox"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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