GHSA-584P-F93J-WPGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 18:36 – Updated: 2026-09-23 18:36Impact
The anonymous front-end action formie/submissions/submit (SubmissionsController::actionSubmit) trusted a client-supplied submissionId when loading an incomplete submission, with no session binding, ownership check, or edit token validation.
An unauthenticated attacker could enumerate sequential submission IDs and overwrite or hijack another user's in-progress (multi-page / save-for-later) submission. Tampered data could be persisted and forwarded via notifications and integrations when the submission was completed.
Completed submissions were not affected (isIncomplete=true filter). This is an incomplete remediation of GHSA-pgxq-p76c-x9cg, which added edit-token validation to save-submission but not to submit.
Patches
Fixed in 3.1.31 (Craft 5) and 2.2.23 (Craft 4).
When resuming an existing submission on a site request, the submission ID must match the session-bound submission (Form::getCurrentSubmission()) or a valid submissionEditToken when editingSubmission is set. Cross-form submission ID reuse is also rejected.
Workarounds
No reliable workaround without upgrading. Disabling multi-page forms or save-for-later reduces exposure but does not remove the vulnerability.
- Reported by Jorge González (jorge@jmilla.es)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "verbb/formie"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "verbb/formie"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76087"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T18:36:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe anonymous front-end action `formie/submissions/submit` (`SubmissionsController::actionSubmit`) trusted a client-supplied `submissionId` when loading an incomplete submission, with no session binding, ownership check, or edit token validation.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker could enumerate sequential submission IDs and overwrite or hijack another user\u0027s in-progress (multi-page / save-for-later) submission. Tampered data could be persisted and forwarded via notifications and integrations when the submission was completed.\n\nCompleted submissions were not affected (`isIncomplete=true` filter). This is an incomplete remediation of [GHSA-pgxq-p76c-x9cg](https://github.com/advisories?query=GHSA-pgxq-p76c-x9cg), which added edit-token validation to `save-submission` but not to `submit`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **3.1.31** (Craft 5) and **2.2.23** (Craft 4).\n\nWhen resuming an existing submission on a site request, the submission ID must match the session-bound submission (`Form::getCurrentSubmission()`) or a valid `submissionEditToken` when `editingSubmission` is set. Cross-form submission ID reuse is also rejected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo reliable workaround without upgrading. Disabling multi-page forms or save-for-later reduces exposure but does not remove the vulnerability.\n\n- Reported by Jorge Gonz\u00e1lez (jorge@jmilla.es)",
"id": "GHSA-584p-f93j-wpgc",
"modified": "2026-09-23T18:36:44Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T18:36:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/security/advisories/GHSA-584p-f93j-wpgc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/commit/323c2fe647a76fbccadf749728ee4ad9420efee1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/commit/78a298ac3baf85ac283988dfce9cd42c9b958f16"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/releases/tag/2.2.23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/releases/tag/3.1.31"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Formie: Unauthenticated users can overwrite incomplete submissions via submit action"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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