GHSA-57VW-2F4G-PVR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-15 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count
The folio refcount may be increased unexpectly through try_get_folio() by caller such as split_huge_pages. In huge_pmd_unshare(), we use refcount to check whether a pmd page table is shared. The check is incorrect if the refcount is increased by the above caller, and this can cause the page table leaked:
BUG: Bad page state in process sh pfn:109324 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x66 pfn:0x109324 flags: 0x17ffff800000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff) page_type: f2(table) raw: 017ffff800000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000066 0000000000000000 00000000f2000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: nonzero mapcount ... CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 7515 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.13.0-rc2master+ #7 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call trace: show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xf8 dump_stack+0x18/0x28 bad_page+0x8c/0x130 free_page_is_bad_report+0xa4/0xb0 free_unref_page+0x3cc/0x620 __folio_put+0xf4/0x158 split_huge_pages_all+0x1e0/0x3e8 split_huge_pages_write+0x25c/0x2d8 full_proxy_write+0x64/0xd8 vfs_write+0xcc/0x280 ksys_write+0x70/0x110 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x34/0x128 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
The issue may be triggered by damon, offline_page, page_idle, etc, which will increase the refcount of page table.
-
The page table itself will be discarded after reporting the "nonzero mapcount".
-
The HugeTLB page mapped by the page table miss freeing since we treat the page table as shared and a shared page table will not be unmapped.
Fix it by introducing independent PMD page table shared count. As described by comment, pt_index/pt_mm/pt_frag_refcount are used for s390 gmap, x86 pgds and powerpc, pt_share_count is used for x86/arm64/riscv pmds, so we can reuse the field as pt_share_count.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57883"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-15T13:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count\n\nThe folio refcount may be increased unexpectly through try_get_folio() by\ncaller such as split_huge_pages. In huge_pmd_unshare(), we use refcount\nto check whether a pmd page table is shared. The check is incorrect if\nthe refcount is increased by the above caller, and this can cause the page\ntable leaked:\n\n BUG: Bad page state in process sh pfn:109324\n page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x66 pfn:0x109324\n flags: 0x17ffff800000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)\n page_type: f2(table)\n raw: 017ffff800000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000\n raw: 0000000000000066 0000000000000000 00000000f2000000 0000000000000000\n page dumped because: nonzero mapcount\n ...\n CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 7515 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.13.0-rc2master+ #7\n Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE\n Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n Call trace:\n show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)\n dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xf8\n dump_stack+0x18/0x28\n bad_page+0x8c/0x130\n free_page_is_bad_report+0xa4/0xb0\n free_unref_page+0x3cc/0x620\n __folio_put+0xf4/0x158\n split_huge_pages_all+0x1e0/0x3e8\n split_huge_pages_write+0x25c/0x2d8\n full_proxy_write+0x64/0xd8\n vfs_write+0xcc/0x280\n ksys_write+0x70/0x110\n __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0\n do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38\n el0_svc+0x34/0x128\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0\n el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198\n\nThe issue may be triggered by damon, offline_page, page_idle, etc, which\nwill increase the refcount of page table.\n\n1. The page table itself will be discarded after reporting the\n \"nonzero mapcount\".\n\n2. The HugeTLB page mapped by the page table miss freeing since we\n treat the page table as shared and a shared page table will not be\n unmapped.\n\nFix it by introducing independent PMD page table shared count. As\ndescribed by comment, pt_index/pt_mm/pt_frag_refcount are used for s390\ngmap, x86 pgds and powerpc, pt_share_count is used for x86/arm64/riscv\npmds, so we can reuse the field as pt_share_count.",
"id": "GHSA-57vw-2f4g-pvr5",
"modified": "2025-11-03T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-01-15T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02333ac1c35370517a19a4a131332a9690c6a5c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e31443a0d18ae43b9d29e02bf0563f07772193d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56b274473d6e7e7375f2d0a2b4aca11d67c6b52f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59d9094df3d79443937add8700b2ef1a866b1081"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8410996eb6fea116fe1483ed977aacf580eee7b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94b4b41d0cdf5cfd4d4325bc0e6e9e0d0e996133"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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