GHSA-572X-M765-7V76
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle
The Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of the same physical device using a shared structure 'wacom_shared' inside 'wacom_hdev_data'. The driver kept a volatile representative pointer 'data->dev' pointing to a sibling 'hid_device' for physical path comparisons during sibling matching.
This pointer management is fragile. When the representative device is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update 'data->dev', leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when subsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling 'data->dev' pointer.
Resolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle:
- Eliminate the volatile 'data->dev' representative pointer completely
- Redesign 'wacom_hdev_data' to store stable static copies of the required attributes upon first allocation: 'phys' path string, 'vendor', 'product' IDs and the sibling's 'device_type'
- Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data()
This ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if individual siblings are dynamically added or removed.
To secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races:
- Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list traversal and lookup
- Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is already held
Also, do not accumulate the 'device_type' capability flag during subsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling's device_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior without introducing side effects.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99489"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle\n\nThe Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of\nthe same physical device using a shared structure \u0027wacom_shared\u0027\ninside \u0027wacom_hdev_data\u0027. The driver kept a volatile representative\npointer \u0027data-\u003edev\u0027 pointing to a sibling \u0027hid_device\u0027 for physical\npath comparisons during sibling matching.\n\nThis pointer management is fragile. When the representative device\nis disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update\n\u0027data-\u003edev\u0027, leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when\nsubsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling \u0027data-\u003edev\u0027\npointer.\n\nResolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle:\n\n - Eliminate the volatile \u0027data-\u003edev\u0027 representative pointer\n completely\n - Redesign \u0027wacom_hdev_data\u0027 to store stable static copies of the\n required attributes upon first allocation: \u0027phys\u0027 path string,\n \u0027vendor\u0027, \u0027product\u0027 IDs and the sibling\u0027s \u0027device_type\u0027\n - Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in\n wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data()\n\nThis ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if\nindividual siblings are dynamically added or removed.\n\nTo secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races:\n\n - Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in\n wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list\n traversal and lookup\n - Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is\n already held\n\nAlso, do not accumulate the \u0027device_type\u0027 capability flag during\nsubsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling\u0027s\ndevice_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior\nwithout introducing side effects.",
"id": "GHSA-572x-m765-7v76",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99489"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/321da540c4a2091c0e23b5f4ced0131a1c77d679"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/480c9cb14ae81f8e112ff83f8778b3d7b9324dc8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4eeb0a16f11c72a0a15e793310470418d1c2d3cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1fb9f9087c76bca6de81aa38e1e9c820dc54744"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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