GHSA-54VH-976R-R6PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm4: use a full socket for local errors
xfrm4_local_error() passes skb->sk to inet_sk() and ip_local_error() without ensuring it points to a full socket. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned by TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request sockets.
xfrm4_tunnel_check_size() already checks sk_fullsock() since commit 1620c88887b1 ("xfrm: Fix the usage of skb->sk"), so iptfs_is_too_big() is the only remaining IPv4 caller passing a request socket here: the sk it tests is the listener, while skb->sk is the request socket.
When IP-TFS rejects such an skb because it exceeds its payload MTU, the local error path treats the request socket as a struct inet_sock. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read in ip_local_error() beyond the request_sock_TCP allocation.
Resolve the skb owner with skb_to_full_sk() before accessing inet_sock state or reporting the error. This maps a request socket to its listener and rejects sockets that cannot be used as full sockets, matching what commit 6973a21ee73c ("ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths") did for xfrm6_local_error().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99767"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm4: use a full socket for local errors\n\nxfrm4_local_error() passes skb-\u003esk to inet_sk() and ip_local_error()\nwithout ensuring it points to a full socket. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned\nby TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request sockets.\n\nxfrm4_tunnel_check_size() already checks sk_fullsock() since commit\n1620c88887b1 (\"xfrm: Fix the usage of skb-\u003esk\"), so iptfs_is_too_big() is\nthe only remaining IPv4 caller passing a request socket here: the sk it\ntests is the listener, while skb-\u003esk is the request socket.\n\nWhen IP-TFS rejects such an skb because it exceeds its payload MTU, the\nlocal error path treats the request socket as a struct inet_sock. KASAN\nreports a slab-out-of-bounds read in ip_local_error() beyond the\nrequest_sock_TCP allocation.\n\nResolve the skb owner with skb_to_full_sk() before accessing inet_sock\nstate or reporting the error. This maps a request socket to its listener\nand rejects sockets that cannot be used as full sockets, matching what\ncommit 6973a21ee73c (\"ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths\")\ndid for xfrm6_local_error().",
"id": "GHSA-54vh-976r-r6pr",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21ba931b2eec642b1c440e0b6eccc2d80f945060"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5def91015ba7b59de62a81384572da7281b8a033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e465b8f50337d0fb3b9753be6cb9fcac79800046"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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