GHSA-54JR-3VX9-2C5P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie()

rtw_restruct_wmm_ie() scans in_ie for a WMM IE with:

while (i < in_len) {
    ...
    if (i + 5 < in_len && in_ie[i] == 0xDD && ...) {
        ...
        break;
    }
    i += (in_ie[i + 1] + 2); /* to the next IE element */
}

When the "i + 5 < in_len" match check fails simply because i is within 5 bytes of the end of the buffer (i.e. no WMM IE was found near the tail of in_ie), execution falls through to "i += (in_ie[i + 1] + 2)", which reads in_ie[i + 1]. If i == in_len - 1 at that point, this is a 1-byte out-of-bounds read of an attacker-influenced IE buffer built from association/scan data.

Commit a75281626fc8f ("staging: rtl8723bs: fix potential out-of-bounds read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie") added the "i + 5 < in_len" guard to the match condition itself, but did not add an equivalent guard before the fallthrough advance, so the same class of OOB read remained reachable through the non-matching path.

Add an explicit bounds check before advancing to the next IE.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90016"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nstaging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie()\n\nrtw_restruct_wmm_ie() scans in_ie for a WMM IE with:\n\n\twhile (i \u003c in_len) {\n\t\t...\n\t\tif (i + 5 \u003c in_len \u0026\u0026 in_ie[i] == 0xDD \u0026\u0026 ...) {\n\t\t\t...\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t\ti += (in_ie[i + 1] + 2); /* to the next IE element */\n\t}\n\nWhen the \"i + 5 \u003c in_len\" match check fails simply because i is\nwithin 5 bytes of the end of the buffer (i.e. no WMM IE was found\nnear the tail of in_ie), execution falls through to\n\"i += (in_ie[i + 1] + 2)\", which reads in_ie[i + 1]. If i == in_len\n- 1 at that point, this is a 1-byte out-of-bounds read of an\nattacker-influenced IE buffer built from association/scan data.\n\nCommit a75281626fc8f (\"staging: rtl8723bs: fix potential\nout-of-bounds read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie\") added the \"i + 5 \u003c\nin_len\" guard to the match condition itself, but did not add an\nequivalent guard before the fallthrough advance, so the same class\nof OOB read remained reachable through the non-matching path.\n\nAdd an explicit bounds check before advancing to the next IE.",
  "id": "GHSA-54jr-3vx9-2c5p",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:30Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c1f8bada613edbd810d010996d36159092576d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28a289beaf226b30b1e6e7d7b1a2946fe2d6e852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4420cc71841b50e31a7868ef7acb011c0e08d294"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55034fa38bd8b302ceb32c15e8a98298f56f629b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/716850842d2f103f915fe7c857ff1a0a036491b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8d76480d1abbbf617c2d6d9f60bf95ab45cff04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e63b72c5d7336981dfc05e5cb92becff29dfea00"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd19b8895f8a91087e8a62f1e27b128025dabb95"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.