GHSA-5445-5XCV-F4GR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-31 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-31 15:34Improper neutralization of input during web page generation in Apache Wicket.
The tag is provided by org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.AutoLabelTextResolver, which is registered by default in every WebApplication. The resolver writes the label it finds into the markup as it is, and reads no escaping setting at all, so markup in a label is rendered as markup.
When the label comes from the labelled component's label model, set through FormComponent#setLabel(IModel), it is written to the markup unescaped. An application is affected where the label of a form component holds data an attacker can influence. Wicket cannot determine where a model value comes from, so whether it reaches the page from a request or from storage is a property of the application.
There is no workaround. Unlike every other rendering path in Wicket, the resolver never consulted the escape-model-strings setting, so an application had no way to ask for the label to be escaped.
The body of a tag is markup by design and is not affected; it remains the supported way to place markup in a label.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.18.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.23.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.10.0. Older, unsupported releases from 1.5.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.19.0, 9.24.0 or 10.11.0, which fix the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76983"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T12:17:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper neutralization of input during web page generation in Apache Wicket.\n\nThe \u003cwicket:label\u003e tag is provided by org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.AutoLabelTextResolver, which is registered by default in every WebApplication. The resolver writes the label it finds into the markup as it is, and reads no escaping setting at all, so markup in a label is rendered as markup.\n\nWhen the label comes from the labelled component\u0027s label model, set through FormComponent#setLabel(IModel), it is written to the markup unescaped.\u00a0An application is affected where the label of a form component holds data an attacker can influence. Wicket cannot determine where a model value comes from, so whether it reaches the page from a request or from storage is a property of the application.\n\nThere is no workaround. Unlike every other rendering path in Wicket, the resolver never consulted the escape-model-strings setting, so an application had no way to ask for the label to be escaped.\n\nThe body of a \u003cwicket:label\u003e tag is markup by design and is not affected; it remains the supported way to place markup in a label.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.18.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.23.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.10.0. Older, unsupported releases from 1.5.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.19.0, 9.24.0 or 10.11.0, which fix the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-5445-5xcv-f4gr",
"modified": "2026-08-31T15:34:42Z",
"published": "2026-08-31T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76983"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/lfc9s9qkgxhm8ffscp9b7gjfgj47g25h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/31/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.