GHSA-52W9-98Q8-6PWF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-14 06:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io-wq: check that the predecessor is hashed in io_wq_remove_pending()
io_wq_remove_pending() needs to fix up wq->hash_tail[] if the cancelled work was the tail of its hash bucket. When doing this, it checks whether the preceding entry in acct->work_list has the same hash value, but never checks that the predecessor is hashed at all. io_get_work_hash() is simply atomic_read(&work->flags) >> IO_WQ_HASH_SHIFT, and the hash bits are never set for non-hashed work, so it returns 0. Thus, when a hashed bucket-0 work is cancelled while a non-hashed work is its list predecessor, the check spuriously passes and a pointer to the non-hashed io_kiocb is stored in wq->hash_tail[0].
Because non-hashed work is dequeued via the fast path in io_get_next_work(), which never touches hash_tail[], the stale pointer is never cleared. Therefore, after the non-hashed io_kiocb completes and is freed back to req_cachep, wq->hash_tail[0] is a dangling pointer. The io_wq is per-task (tctx->io_wq) and survives ring open/close, so the dangling pointer persists for the lifetime of the task; the next hashed bucket-0 enqueue dereferences it in io_wq_insert_work() and wq_list_add_after() writes through freed memory.
Add the missing io_wq_is_hashed() check so a non-hashed predecessor never inherits a hash_tail[] slot.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46274"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T16:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio-wq: check that the predecessor is hashed in io_wq_remove_pending()\n\nio_wq_remove_pending() needs to fix up wq-\u003ehash_tail[] if the cancelled\nwork was the tail of its hash bucket. When doing this, it checks whether\nthe preceding entry in acct-\u003ework_list has the same hash value, but\nnever checks that the predecessor is hashed at all. io_get_work_hash()\nis simply atomic_read(\u0026work-\u003eflags) \u003e\u003e IO_WQ_HASH_SHIFT, and the hash\nbits are never set for non-hashed work, so it returns 0. Thus, when a\nhashed bucket-0 work is cancelled while a non-hashed work is its list\npredecessor, the check spuriously passes and a pointer to the non-hashed\nio_kiocb is stored in wq-\u003ehash_tail[0].\n\nBecause non-hashed work is dequeued via the fast path in\nio_get_next_work(), which never touches hash_tail[], the stale pointer\nis never cleared. Therefore, after the non-hashed io_kiocb completes and\nis freed back to req_cachep, wq-\u003ehash_tail[0] is a dangling pointer. The\nio_wq is per-task (tctx-\u003eio_wq) and survives ring open/close, so the\ndangling pointer persists for the lifetime of the task; the next hashed\nbucket-0 enqueue dereferences it in io_wq_insert_work() and\nwq_list_add_after() writes through freed memory.\n\nAdd the missing io_wq_is_hashed() check so a non-hashed predecessor\nnever inherits a hash_tail[] slot.",
"id": "GHSA-52w9-98q8-6pwf",
"modified": "2026-06-14T06:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T18:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/252c5051dba9c709b6a72f2866f93e5e618b3f06"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a20ebf0c81b61f5ea3b1b529c100cad69b9f603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d376c131af7c7739a87ff037ed2fdb67c2542c8a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6a2d7b04b5a093021a7a0e2e69e9d5237dfa8cc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6bda9df0c0a3080804181464d5c0f4d78a4e769"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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