GHSA-4XJ2-88X8-3W8G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 15:42 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:42A Thrift client in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0, built with WITH_THRIFT which is off by default) can be crashed by the server peer it talks to. When the server returns a T_EXCEPTION reply whose exception struct is malformed, the client decodes it without catching what Apache Thrift throws (TProtocolException, TTransportException or std::length_error). The exception unwinds out of the bthread task function and the process calls std::terminate(), terminating the whole process along with every other in-flight RPC.
This is the client response path, so the adversary is the server peer, which THREAT_MODEL.md treats as untrusted. It requires a WITH_THRIFT build (off by default).
How to Fix: 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3500
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-82231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T13:20:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "A Thrift client in Apache bRPC (version \u003c 1.18.0, built with WITH_THRIFT which is off by default) can be crashed by the server peer it talks to. When the server returns a T_EXCEPTION reply whose exception struct is malformed, the client decodes it without catching what Apache Thrift throws (TProtocolException, TTransportException or std::length_error). The exception unwinds out of the bthread task function and the process calls std::terminate(), terminating the whole process along with every other in-flight RPC.\n\nThis is the client response path, so the adversary is the server peer, which THREAT_MODEL.md treats as untrusted. It requires a WITH_THRIFT build (off by default).\n\nHow to Fix:\n1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.\n2. Apply this patch:\u00a0https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3500",
"id": "GHSA-4xj2-88x8-3w8g",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:42:28Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T15:42:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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