GHSA-4X9Q-VPRP-3QVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-13 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/ras: Move ras data alloc before bad page check
In the rare event if eeprom has only invalid address entries, allocation is skipped, this causes following NULL pointer issue [ 547.103445] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 547.118897] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 547.130292] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 547.141689] PGD 124757067 P4D 0 [ 547.148842] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 547.158504] CPU: 49 PID: 8167 Comm: cat Tainted: G OE 6.8.0-38-generic #38-Ubuntu [ 547.177998] Hardware name: Supermicro AS -8126GS-TNMR/H14DSG-OD, BIOS 1.7 09/12/2025 [ 547.195178] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_ras_sysfs_badpages_read+0x2f2/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 547.210375] Code: e8 63 78 82 c0 45 31 d2 45 3b 75 08 48 8b 45 a0 73 44 44 89 f1 48 8b 7d 88 48 89 ca 48 c1 e2 05 48 29 ca 49 8b 4d 00 48 01 d1 <48> 83 79 10 00 74 17 49 63 f2 48 8b 49 08 41 83 c2 01 48 8d 34 76 [ 547.252045] RSP: 0018:ffa0000067287ac0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 547.263636] RAX: ff11000167c28130 RBX: ff11000127600000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 547.279467] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000125b1c800 [ 547.295298] RBP: ffa0000067287b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 547.311129] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 547.326959] R13: ff11000217b1de00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000092 [ 547.342790] FS: 0000746e59d14740(0000) GS:ff11017dfda80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 547.360744] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 547.373489] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000019585e001 CR4: 0000000000f71ef0 [ 547.389321] PKRU: 55555554 [ 547.395316] Call Trace: [ 547.400737] [ 547.405386] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 [ 547.412929] ? __die+0x24/0x80 [ 547.419697] ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0 [ 547.428588] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0 [ 547.438249] ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0 [ 547.446949] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [ 547.456225] ? amdgpu_ras_sysfs_badpages_read+0x2f2/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 547.470040] ? mas_wr_modify+0xcd/0x140 [ 547.478548] sysfs_kf_bin_read+0x63/0xb0 [ 547.487248] kernfs_file_read_iter+0xa1/0x190 [ 547.496909] kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x25/0x40 [ 547.506182] vfs_read+0x255/0x390
This also result in space left assigned to negative values. Moving data alloc call before bad page check resolves both the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71293"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T12:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu/ras: Move ras data alloc before bad page check\n\nIn the rare event if eeprom has only invalid address entries,\nallocation is skipped, this causes following NULL pointer issue\n[ 547.103445] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010\n[ 547.118897] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n[ 547.130292] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n[ 547.141689] PGD 124757067 P4D 0\n[ 547.148842] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\n[ 547.158504] CPU: 49 PID: 8167 Comm: cat Tainted: G OE 6.8.0-38-generic #38-Ubuntu\n[ 547.177998] Hardware name: Supermicro AS -8126GS-TNMR/H14DSG-OD, BIOS 1.7 09/12/2025\n[ 547.195178] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_ras_sysfs_badpages_read+0x2f2/0x5d0 [amdgpu]\n[ 547.210375] Code: e8 63 78 82 c0 45 31 d2 45 3b 75 08 48 8b 45 a0 73 44 44 89 f1 48 8b 7d 88 48 89 ca 48 c1 e2 05 48 29 ca 49 8b 4d 00 48 01 d1 \u003c48\u003e 83 79 10 00 74 17 49 63 f2 48 8b 49 08 41 83 c2 01 48 8d 34 76\n[ 547.252045] RSP: 0018:ffa0000067287ac0 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 547.263636] RAX: ff11000167c28130 RBX: ff11000127600000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 547.279467] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000125b1c800\n[ 547.295298] RBP: ffa0000067287b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[ 547.311129] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000\n[ 547.326959] R13: ff11000217b1de00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000092\n[ 547.342790] FS: 0000746e59d14740(0000) GS:ff11017dfda80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 547.360744] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 547.373489] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000019585e001 CR4: 0000000000f71ef0\n[ 547.389321] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 547.395316] Call Trace:\n[ 547.400737] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 547.405386] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80\n[ 547.412929] ? __die+0x24/0x80\n[ 547.419697] ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0\n[ 547.428588] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0\n[ 547.438249] ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0\n[ 547.446949] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30\n[ 547.456225] ? amdgpu_ras_sysfs_badpages_read+0x2f2/0x5d0 [amdgpu]\n[ 547.470040] ? mas_wr_modify+0xcd/0x140\n[ 547.478548] sysfs_kf_bin_read+0x63/0xb0\n[ 547.487248] kernfs_file_read_iter+0xa1/0x190\n[ 547.496909] kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x25/0x40\n[ 547.506182] vfs_read+0x255/0x390\n\nThis also result in space left assigned to negative values.\nMoving data alloc call before bad page check resolves both the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-4x9q-vprp-3qvr",
"modified": "2026-05-13T21:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T12:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71293"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b7f78caeffa51a1afa521c284e863ec3b5a36df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c685235b60459381e959109b416a63db4d8dbac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd68a1404b6fa2e7e9957b38ba22616faba43e75"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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