GHSA-4VRG-R928-H5VV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42Impact
Under concurrency, CheckPermission and CheckBulkPermissions can return PERMISSIONSHIP_HAS_PERMISSION for a (resource, permission, subject) whose correct answer is PERMISSIONSHIP_CONDITIONAL_PERMISSION.
You are impacted if all of the following hold:
- Your schema has a permission combining relations with an intersection or exclusion, where a subject reaches it through a caveated branch and a non-caveated branch. For example:
definition user {}
caveat some_caveat(somecondition int) { somecondition == 42 }
definition document {
relation reader: user | user with some_caveat
relation writer: user
relation banned: user
permission has_permission = (reader & writer) - banned
}
- A subject reaches the permission via the caveated edge:
document:firstdoc#reader@user:caveatedreader[some_caveat]
document:firstdoc#writer@user:caveatedreader
- Your workload issues
LookupResourceswith acontextrequest parameter, concurrently withCheckPermission/CheckBulkPermissionsfor the same subject/resource, and - The dispatch result cache is enabled.
When all of the above are true, there is an intermittent window in which:
CheckPermission(document:firstdoc, has_permission, user:caveatedreader) → HAS_PERMISSION (incorrect; should be CONDITIONAL_PERMISSION)
CheckPermission(document:firstdoc, has_permission, user:caveatedreader, context = {"somecondition": 41}) → HAS_PERMISSION (incorrect; should be NO_PERMISSION)
Patches
v1.54.0
Workarounds
Disable the dispatch result cache (ClusterDispatchCacheConfig and DispatchCacheConfig)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/authzed/spicedb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.34.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.54.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55866"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n Under concurrency, `CheckPermission` and `CheckBulkPermissions` can return `PERMISSIONSHIP_HAS_PERMISSION` for a (resource, permission, subject) whose correct answer is `PERMISSIONSHIP_CONDITIONAL_PERMISSION`. \n\n You are impacted if **all** of the following hold:\n\n 1. Your schema has a permission combining relations with an intersection or exclusion, where a subject reaches it through a caveated branch and a non-caveated branch. For example:\n\n```zed\n definition user {}\n\n caveat some_caveat(somecondition int) { somecondition == 42 }\n\n definition document {\n relation reader: user | user with some_caveat\n relation writer: user\n relation banned: user\n permission has_permission = (reader \u0026 writer) - banned\n }\n```\n\n 2. A subject reaches the permission via the caveated edge:\n\n```\n document:firstdoc#reader@user:caveatedreader[some_caveat]\n document:firstdoc#writer@user:caveatedreader\n```\n 3. Your workload issues `LookupResources` with a `context` request parameter, concurrently with `CheckPermission/CheckBulkPermissions` for the same subject/resource, and\n 4. The dispatch result cache is enabled.\n \nWhen all of the above are true, there is an intermittent window in which:\n\n`CheckPermission(document:firstdoc, has_permission, user:caveatedreader)` \u2192 HAS_PERMISSION (incorrect; should be CONDITIONAL_PERMISSION)\n\n`CheckPermission(document:firstdoc, has_permission, user:caveatedreader, context = {\"somecondition\": 41})` \u2192 HAS_PERMISSION (incorrect; should be NO_PERMISSION)\n\n### Patches\n\nv1.54.0\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the dispatch result cache (`ClusterDispatchCacheConfig` and `DispatchCacheConfig`)",
"id": "GHSA-4vrg-r928-h5vv",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:12Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:42:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/authzed/spicedb/security/advisories/GHSA-4vrg-r928-h5vv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/authzed/spicedb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SpiceDB: Checks involving relations with caveats can result in unconditional permission when conditional permission is expected"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.