GHSA-4VPR-X523-8J87
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:20 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:20Summary
SVGO's opt-in removeScripts plugin did not inspect executable HTML content inside SVG <foreignObject> elements. Applications that used this plugin as their only protection for untrusted SVG input could produce SVGs containing active HTML and expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS).
SVGO is an optimizer rather than a comprehensive sanitization library, but removeScripts is maintained for consumers that already rely on it to remove common script execution paths.
Details
Although the plugin removed SVG and XHTML <script> elements, it left other HTML execution paths inside <foreignObject> unchanged. These included:
- event-handler attributes such as
onloadandonbeforetoggle; srcdocdocuments, including on<iframe>elements;- executable URLs in HTML attributes such as
action,data,formaction,href, andsrc.
An attacker could place one of these payloads in an SVG. If an application optimized the untrusted SVG with removeScripts and then served the result in an active browser context, the payload could execute in the viewer's origin.
Impact
Successful exploitation could allow script execution in the context where the optimized SVG is rendered. Depending on the embedding and origin configuration, this could expose cookies or local storage, modify content, or perform actions as the victim.
The plugin is opt-in, so consumers that do not enable removeScripts are not relying on the affected behavior. Typical local optimization of trusted SVG files is not affected.
Patches
Upgrade to one of the following releases for the maintained release line in use:
| Release line | Patched version | Plugin |
|---|---|---|
| v2 | 2.8.4 | removeScriptElement |
| v3 | 3.3.5 | removeScriptElement |
| v4 | 4.1.0 | removeScripts |
The fix preserves visual HTML inside SVG <foreignObject> elements while removing event attributes, srcdoc, and executable URL values from active HTML URL attributes.
SVGO v1 is no longer maintained. Users of v1 should upgrade to a supported release line.
Workarounds
For hostile input, use a dedicated SVG sanitization tool before passing the SVG to SVGO. As defense in depth, applications can reject or remove <foreignObject> content and avoid serving user-controlled SVGs in an active same-origin context.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "svgo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "svgo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "svgo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84369"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:20:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T21:18:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSVGO\u0027s opt-in `removeScripts` plugin did not inspect executable HTML content inside SVG `\u003cforeignObject\u003e` elements. Applications that used this plugin as their only protection for untrusted SVG input could produce SVGs containing active HTML and expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS).\n\nSVGO is an optimizer rather than a comprehensive sanitization library, but `removeScripts` is maintained for consumers that already rely on it to remove common script execution paths.\n\n## Details\n\nAlthough the plugin removed SVG and XHTML `\u003cscript\u003e` elements, it left other HTML execution paths inside `\u003cforeignObject\u003e` unchanged. These included:\n\n- event-handler attributes such as `onload` and `onbeforetoggle`;\n- `srcdoc` documents, including on `\u003ciframe\u003e` elements;\n- executable URLs in HTML attributes such as `action`, `data`, `formaction`, `href`, and `src`.\n\nAn attacker could place one of these payloads in an SVG. If an application optimized the untrusted SVG with `removeScripts` and then served the result in an active browser context, the payload could execute in the viewer\u0027s origin.\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation could allow script execution in the context where the optimized SVG is rendered. Depending on the embedding and origin configuration, this could expose cookies or local storage, modify content, or perform actions as the victim.\n\nThe plugin is opt-in, so consumers that do not enable `removeScripts` are not relying on the affected behavior. Typical local optimization of trusted SVG files is not affected.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to one of the following releases for the maintained release line in use:\n\n| Release line | Patched version | Plugin |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| v2 | 2.8.4 | `removeScriptElement` |\n| v3 | 3.3.5 | `removeScriptElement` |\n| v4 | 4.1.0 | `removeScripts` |\n\nThe fix preserves visual HTML inside SVG `\u003cforeignObject\u003e` elements while removing event attributes, `srcdoc`, and executable URL values from active HTML URL attributes.\n\nSVGO v1 is no longer maintained. Users of v1 should upgrade to a supported release line.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nFor hostile input, use a dedicated SVG sanitization tool before passing the SVG to SVGO. As defense in depth, applications can reject or remove `\u003cforeignObject\u003e` content and avoid serving user-controlled SVGs in an active same-origin context.",
"id": "GHSA-4vpr-x523-8j87",
"modified": "2026-09-08T21:20:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T21:20:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/security/advisories/GHSA-4vpr-x523-8j87"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/pull/2264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/pull/2269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/pull/2272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/commit/0557385564a5c6c11d76cd934a6cff94451e532c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/commit/994a9f00d79ddec68ce19a1ce9eb8ca08d747e4f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/commit/fd51e474a300417d9361d9302d596b1763146327"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/releases/tag/v2.8.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/releases/tag/v3.3.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svg/svgo/releases/tag/v4.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SVGO: removeScripts incompletely sanitizes executable HTML in SVG foreignObject elements"
}
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