GHSA-4VP2-6Q8C-PVQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 16:53 – Updated: 2026-06-25 16:53The Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.59"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.128"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-200",
"CWE-377"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T16:53:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Claude Code `/copy` command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (`/tmp/claude/response.md`) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user\u0027s Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the `/copy` command.\n\nUsers on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.\n\nClaude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-4vp2-6q8c-pvq2",
"modified": "2026-06-25T16:53:00Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T16:53:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-4vp2-6q8c-pvq2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code has an Insecure Temporary File in /copy Command that Enables Response Disclosure and Symlink-Based File Write"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.