GHSA-4R68-7RG9-V6JJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-06 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-06 15:31Jumis (formerly Tildes Jumis) creates and uses a Microsoft SQL Server login named ##Tilde_JumisAdmin## whose password is derived deterministically from a single non-secret input - the SQL Server name (@@servername). The derivation algorithm is hard-coded in the client application and is identical across every installation; it contains a hard-coded secret key for entropy. Because the only input (the server name) is not secret - the instance suffix is hard-coded and the host name is discoverable via the SQL Server Browser service (UDP 1434), the TDS pre-login response, or DNS/NetBIOS - any party able to reach a Jumis SQL Server can compute the password offline and authenticate. The ##Tilde_JumisAdmin## login is a member of the sysadmin server role. Successful authentication therefore grants full administrative control of the SQL Server instance and read/write access to every customer's accounting database hosted on it. The on-premise server installation also programmatically enables xp_cmdshell during routine operation, so sysadmin access escalates to operating-system command execution on the database server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-547"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-06T15:17:22Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Jumis (formerly Tildes Jumis) creates and uses a Microsoft SQL Server login named ##Tilde_JumisAdmin## whose password is derived deterministically from a single non-secret input - the SQL Server name (@@servername). The derivation algorithm is hard-coded in the client application and is identical across every installation; it contains a hard-coded secret key for entropy. Because the only input (the server name) is not secret - the instance suffix is hard-coded and the host name is discoverable via the SQL Server Browser service (UDP 1434), the TDS pre-login response, or DNS/NetBIOS - any party able to reach a Jumis SQL Server can compute the password offline and authenticate.\u00a0The ##Tilde_JumisAdmin## login is a member of the sysadmin server role. Successful authentication therefore grants full administrative control of the SQL Server instance and read/write access to every customer\u0027s accounting database hosted on it. The on-premise server installation also programmatically enables xp_cmdshell during routine operation, so sysadmin access escalates to operating-system command execution on the database server.",
"id": "GHSA-4r68-7rg9-v6jj",
"modified": "2026-11-06T15:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-11-06T15:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://offseq.com/en/research/jumis-cve-2026-59105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mansjumis.lv"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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