GHSA-4QQR-2JJ8-H8Q8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-21 12:31 – Updated: 2025-10-21 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ip_gre: test csum_start instead of transport header

GRE with TUNNEL_CSUM will apply local checksum offload on CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets.

ipgre_xmit must validate csum_start after an optional skb_pull, else lco_csum may trigger an overflow. The original check was

if (csum && skb_checksum_start(skb) < skb->data)
    return -EINVAL;

This had false positives when skb_checksum_start is undefined: when ip_summed is not CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. A discussed refinement was straightforward

if (csum && skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
    skb_checksum_start(skb) < skb->data)
    return -EINVAL;

But was eventually revised more thoroughly: - restrict the check to the only branch where needed, in an uncommon GRE path that uses header_ops and calls skb_pull. - test skb_transport_header, which is set along with csum_start in skb_partial_csum_set in the normal header_ops datapath.

Turns out skbs can arrive in this branch without the transport header set, e.g., through BPF redirection.

Revise the check back to check csum_start directly, and only if CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. Do leave the check in the updated location. Check field regardless of whether TUNNEL_CSUM is configured.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nip_gre: test csum_start instead of transport header\n\nGRE with TUNNEL_CSUM will apply local checksum offload on\nCHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets.\n\nipgre_xmit must validate csum_start after an optional skb_pull,\nelse lco_csum may trigger an overflow. The original check was\n\n\tif (csum \u0026\u0026 skb_checksum_start(skb) \u003c skb-\u003edata)\n\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n\nThis had false positives when skb_checksum_start is undefined:\nwhen ip_summed is not CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. A discussed refinement\nwas straightforward\n\n\tif (csum \u0026\u0026 skb-\u003eip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL \u0026\u0026\n\t    skb_checksum_start(skb) \u003c skb-\u003edata)\n\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n\nBut was eventually revised more thoroughly:\n- restrict the check to the only branch where needed, in an\n  uncommon GRE path that uses header_ops and calls skb_pull.\n- test skb_transport_header, which is set along with csum_start\n  in skb_partial_csum_set in the normal header_ops datapath.\n\nTurns out skbs can arrive in this branch without the transport\nheader set, e.g., through BPF redirection.\n\nRevise the check back to check csum_start directly, and only if\nCHECKSUM_PARTIAL. Do leave the check in the updated location.\nCheck field regardless of whether TUNNEL_CSUM is configured.",
  "id": "GHSA-4qqr-2jj8-h8q8",
  "modified": "2025-10-21T12:31:25Z",
  "published": "2025-10-21T12:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49340"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c92d813c7c9ca2212ecd879232e7d87362fce98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ffa268724656633af5f37a38c212326d98ebe8c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d08bc3a5d9b2106f5c8bcf1adb73147824aa006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7596bd7920985f7fc8579a92e48bc53ce4475b21"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d21e9963bec1aad2280cdd034c8993033ef2948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6b6f98fc7605c06c0a3baa70f62c534d7b4ce58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbeb8dfa8b87ef259eef0c89e39b53962a3cf604"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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