GHSA-4PR7-H3P8-C732
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-28 12:30 – Updated: 2025-09-26 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix potential double remove of hotplug slot
In commit 6ee600bfbe0f ("s390/pci: remove hotplug slot when releasing the device") the zpci_exit_slot() was moved from zpci_device_reserved() to zpci_release_device() with the intention of keeping the hotplug slot around until the device is actually removed.
Now zpci_release_device() is only called once all references are dropped. Since the zPCI subsystem only drops its reference once the device is in the reserved state it follows that zpci_release_device() must only deal with devices in the reserved state. Despite that it contains code to tear down from both configured and standby state. For the standby case this already includes the removal of the hotplug slot so would cause a double removal if a device was ever removed in either configured or standby state.
Instead of causing a potential double removal in a case that should never happen explicitly WARN_ON() if a device in non-reserved state is released and get rid of the dead code cases.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56699"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-415"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-28T10:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/pci: Fix potential double remove of hotplug slot\n\nIn commit 6ee600bfbe0f (\"s390/pci: remove hotplug slot when releasing the\ndevice\") the zpci_exit_slot() was moved from zpci_device_reserved() to\nzpci_release_device() with the intention of keeping the hotplug slot\naround until the device is actually removed.\n\nNow zpci_release_device() is only called once all references are\ndropped. Since the zPCI subsystem only drops its reference once the\ndevice is in the reserved state it follows that zpci_release_device()\nmust only deal with devices in the reserved state. Despite that it\ncontains code to tear down from both configured and standby state. For\nthe standby case this already includes the removal of the hotplug slot\nso would cause a double removal if a device was ever removed in\neither configured or standby state.\n\nInstead of causing a potential double removal in a case that should\nnever happen explicitly WARN_ON() if a device in non-reserved state is\nreleased and get rid of the dead code cases.",
"id": "GHSA-4pr7-h3p8-c732",
"modified": "2025-09-26T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-12-28T12:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/371bd905599d18da62d75e3974acbf6a41e315c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1489651071ab1be46d2af1da8adb15c9fc3c069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4a585e952ca403a370586d3f16e8331a7564901"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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