GHSA-4PF7-CC4R-G63H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 21:02 – Updated: 2026-07-09 21:02Summary
YesWiki through the latest development branch contains a SQL injection vulnerability in ReactionManager::deleteUserReaction() that allows any authenticated user to inject arbitrary SQL via the {idreaction} and {id} URL path parameters. The parameters are concatenated directly into a SQL LIKE clause without escaping or parameterization.
This is a sibling of CVE-2026-46670 (unauthenticated SQLi in FormManager::create()). Both share the same root cause — raw string concatenation into SQL queries — but exist in different components.
Root Cause
includes/controllers/ApiController.php line 726:
/**
* @Route("/api/reactions/{idreaction}/{id}/{page}/{username}", methods={"DELETE"}, options={"acl":{"+"}})
*/
ACL "+" = any authenticated user. Parameters flow into ReactionManager::deleteUserReaction() → TripleStore::delete() with raw string concatenation into SQL LIKE clause (line 356).
The if branch (lines 340-354) properly uses $this->dbService->escape(). The else branch does not — the developer applied escaping to one code path but not the other.
PoC
DELETE /wiki/?api/reactions/x%27%20OR%201=1%20OR%20value%20LIKE%20%27/test/SomePage/attacker
Host: localhost:8085
Cookie: <session cookie>
Time-based blind variant via {id} parameter for data exfiltration.
Impact
Full database read/write. Any self-registered user can extract yeswiki_users password hashes and emails.
Suggested Fix
Apply $this->dbService->escape() to all parameters in the else branch, matching the if branch pattern. Also audit all TripleStore::delete() callers that pass $extraSQL.
Credits
Kai Aizen / SnailSploit
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "yeswiki/yeswiki"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52775"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T21:02:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nYesWiki through the latest development branch contains a SQL injection vulnerability in `ReactionManager::deleteUserReaction()` that allows any authenticated user to inject arbitrary SQL via the `{idreaction}` and `{id}` URL path parameters. The parameters are concatenated directly into a SQL LIKE clause without escaping or parameterization.\n\nThis is a sibling of CVE-2026-46670 (unauthenticated SQLi in `FormManager::create()`). Both share the same root cause \u2014 raw string concatenation into SQL queries \u2014 but exist in different components.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`includes/controllers/ApiController.php` line 726:\n```php\n/**\n * @Route(\"/api/reactions/{idreaction}/{id}/{page}/{username}\", methods={\"DELETE\"}, options={\"acl\":{\"+\"}})\n */\n```\n\nACL `\"+\"` = any authenticated user. Parameters flow into `ReactionManager::deleteUserReaction()` \u2192 `TripleStore::delete()` with raw string concatenation into SQL LIKE clause (line 356).\n\nThe `if` branch (lines 340-354) properly uses `$this-\u003edbService-\u003eescape()`. The `else` branch does not \u2014 the developer applied escaping to one code path but not the other.\n\n## PoC\n\n```\nDELETE /wiki/?api/reactions/x%27%20OR%201=1%20OR%20value%20LIKE%20%27/test/SomePage/attacker\nHost: localhost:8085\nCookie: \u003csession cookie\u003e\n```\n\nTime-based blind variant via `{id}` parameter for data exfiltration.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull database read/write. Any self-registered user can extract `yeswiki_users` password hashes and emails.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply `$this-\u003edbService-\u003eescape()` to all parameters in the `else` branch, matching the `if` branch pattern. Also audit all `TripleStore::delete()` callers that pass `$extraSQL`.\n\n## Credits\n\nKai Aizen / SnailSploit",
"id": "GHSA-4pf7-cc4r-g63h",
"modified": "2026-07-09T21:02:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T21:02:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/security/advisories/GHSA-4pf7-cc4r-g63h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/commit/90ca54fb518e1c43a1ead6e4f5bf9f0389789841"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "YesWiki has Authenticated SQL Injection via ReactionManager "
}
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