GHSA-4JX3-FH7F-PXHW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure
fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale rwsem.
For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr() with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set:
truncate(2) └─ do_truncate() ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID └─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv: │ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_do_setattr() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate └─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE └─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO return err # <- lock leaked
Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts() failure path as well.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80856"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:14Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure\n\nfuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate\n(fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But\nwhen a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure\nreturns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on\nthe file stalls on the stale rwsem.\n\nFor example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr()\nwith both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set:\n\n truncate(2)\n \u2514\u2500 do_truncate()\n \u251c\u2500 dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID\n \u2514\u2500 notify_change() # KILL_SUID -\u003e ATTR_MODE\n \u2514\u2500 fuse_setattr() # no killpriv:\n \u2502 # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE\n \u2514\u2500 fuse_do_setattr()\n \u251c\u2500 filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX \u0026\u0026 is_truncate\n \u2514\u2500 write_inode_now() # is_wb \u0026\u0026 ATTR_MODE\n \u2514\u2500 if (err) # e.g. daemon -\u003e -EIO\n return err # \u003c- lock leaked\n\nFix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before\nreturning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts()\nfailure path as well.",
"id": "GHSA-4jx3-fh7f-pxhw",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:16Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80856"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03cfeeb135428fa83f0791d3f8f94d9298cae695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1758730d9eaa3c06cf415c3446d9f6eed9ed3eed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f14906ce9103ab8f2f1ebda45935a0d61b9d763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92588d187ba4697a322e7aefe5d9e538a87d1cd2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92faaee1b108c6e4b07730d20896a6593a85f675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9afeca0d569c9fc89d758fe7a9339d1e8afb1546"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd278d954c0e96a9cbd3cc491e07b8267d25f8d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8457ebfd77a46e8d1210e8888ea914ad064558e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea9fea370b8de4ffd72e0ef89550415c15637787"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.