GHSA-4JVR-VJ2C-8Q37
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 23:12 – Updated: 2026-02-04 23:12Impact
The vault key is sealed using SHA1 PCRs instead of SHA256 PCRs
Thus an attacker with physical access to an EVE-OS device can try to brute force creating a kernel or rootfs image which produces the same SHA1 PCR but with malicious content.
Patches
Fixed in 9.4.3-lts and 10.1.0
Workarounds
None
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lf-edge/eve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20230519072751-977f42b07fa9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43635"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-328",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T23:12:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe vault key is sealed using SHA1 PCRs instead of SHA256 PCRs\n\nThus an attacker with physical access to an EVE-OS device can try to brute force creating a kernel or rootfs image which produces the same SHA1 PCR but with malicious content.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 9.4.3-lts and 10.1.0\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone",
"id": "GHSA-4jvr-vj2c-8q37",
"modified": "2026-02-04T23:12:29Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T23:12:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/eve/security/advisories/GHSA-4jvr-vj2c-8q37"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asrg.io/security-advisories/cve-2023-43635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asrg.io/security-advisories/vault-key-sealed-with-sha1-pcrs"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/eve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EVE Seals Vault Key With SHA1 PCRs"
}
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