GHSA-4J58-87G3-FV33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-28 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-30 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: udf: fix OOB read in lengthAllocDescs handling
When parsing Allocation Extent Descriptor, lengthAllocDescs comes from on-disk data and must be validated against the block size. Crafted or corrupted images may set lengthAllocDescs so that the total descriptor length (sizeof(allocExtDesc) + lengthAllocDescs) exceeds the buffer, leading udf_update_tag() to call crc_itu_t() on out-of-bounds memory and trigger a KASAN use-after-free read.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in crc_itu_t+0x1d5/0x2b0 lib/crc-itu-t.c:60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888041e7d000 by task syz-executor317/5309
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-syzkaller-00261-g850925a8133c #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 crc_itu_t+0x1d5/0x2b0 lib/crc-itu-t.c:60 udf_update_tag+0x70/0x6a0 fs/udf/misc.c:261 udf_write_aext+0x4d8/0x7b0 fs/udf/inode.c:2179 extent_trunc+0x2f7/0x4a0 fs/udf/truncate.c:46 udf_truncate_tail_extent+0x527/0x7e0 fs/udf/truncate.c:106 udf_release_file+0xc1/0x120 fs/udf/file.c:185 __fput+0x23f/0x880 fs/file_table.c:431 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:239 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x28e0 kernel/exit.c:939 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1088 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1099 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1097 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1097 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Validate the computed total length against epos->bh->b_size.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-40044"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-28T12:15:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: udf: fix OOB read in lengthAllocDescs handling\n\nWhen parsing Allocation Extent Descriptor, lengthAllocDescs comes from\non-disk data and must be validated against the block size. Crafted or\ncorrupted images may set lengthAllocDescs so that the total descriptor\nlength (sizeof(allocExtDesc) + lengthAllocDescs) exceeds the buffer,\nleading udf_update_tag() to call crc_itu_t() on out-of-bounds memory and\ntrigger a KASAN use-after-free read.\n\nBUG: KASAN: use-after-free in crc_itu_t+0x1d5/0x2b0 lib/crc-itu-t.c:60\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff888041e7d000 by task syz-executor317/5309\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-syzkaller-00261-g850925a8133c #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]\n print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488\n kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601\n crc_itu_t+0x1d5/0x2b0 lib/crc-itu-t.c:60\n udf_update_tag+0x70/0x6a0 fs/udf/misc.c:261\n udf_write_aext+0x4d8/0x7b0 fs/udf/inode.c:2179\n extent_trunc+0x2f7/0x4a0 fs/udf/truncate.c:46\n udf_truncate_tail_extent+0x527/0x7e0 fs/udf/truncate.c:106\n udf_release_file+0xc1/0x120 fs/udf/file.c:185\n __fput+0x23f/0x880 fs/file_table.c:431\n task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:239\n exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline]\n do_exit+0xa2f/0x28e0 kernel/exit.c:939\n do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1088\n __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1099 [inline]\n __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1097 [inline]\n __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1097\n x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nValidate the computed total length against epos-\u003ebh-\u003eb_size.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.",
"id": "GHSA-4j58-87g3-fv33",
"modified": "2026-07-30T06:32:12Z",
"published": "2025-10-28T12:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14496175b264d30c2045584ee31d062af2e3a660"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d1847812a1a5375c10a2a779338df643f79c047"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bd5e45c2ce30e239d596becd5db720f7eb83c99"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/459404f858213967ccfff336c41747d8dd186d38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/918649364fbca7d5df72522ca795479edcd25f91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a70dcfa8d0a0cc530a6af59483dfca260b652c1b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b57f2d7d3e6bb89ed82330c5fe106cdfa34d3e24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2ed9aa8ae50fb0d4ac5ab07e4c67ba7e9a24818"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.