GHSA-4J4W-3WCX-MXG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-25 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check
When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with
xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len
to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk, we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost to start placing data from
hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len
not hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM
But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in the first buffer can only be
xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size()
not xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len
like in the current check.
This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum frame's length.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-25T14:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame\u0027s length check\n\nWhen calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data\u0027s length\nwithout virtio header\u0027s length (vi-\u003ehdr_len). We check that len with\n\n\txsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi-\u003ehdr_len\n\nto ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk\nsize. The additional vi-\u003ehdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk,\nwe use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost\nto start placing data from\n\n\thard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi-\u003ehdr_len\nnot\n\thard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM\n\nBut the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame\u0027s length in\nthe first buffer can only be\n\n\txsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size()\nnot\n\txsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi-\u003ehdr_len\n\nlike in the current check.\n\nThis commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate\nbetween the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum\nframe\u0027s length.",
"id": "GHSA-4j4w-3wcx-mxg6",
"modified": "2025-11-19T18:31:16Z",
"published": "2025-07-25T15:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38413"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5177373c31318c3c6a190383bfd232e6cf565c36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6013bb6bc24c2cac3f45b37a15b71b232a5b00ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/892f6ed9a4a38bb3360fdff091b9241cfa105b61"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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