GHSA-4HWH-2G43-5522
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ila: reload IPv6 header after pskb_may_pull in checksum adjust
ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head() and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator() uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.
Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are unauthenticated once it exists.
Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport() before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map modes never pull and keep their cached pointers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68127"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:19:57Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nila: reload IPv6 header after pskb_may_pull in checksum adjust\n\nila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling\npskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page\nfragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head()\nand free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following\nget_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator()\nuses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust\ncall and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.\n\nImpact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA\ncsum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a\nslab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or\nmapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are\nunauthenticated once it exists.\n\nReload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport()\nbefore the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the\nILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in\nthat case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map\nmodes never pull and keep their cached pointers.",
"id": "GHSA-4hwh-2g43-5522",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68127"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1eadcb43893b897ade85ac5bf5c618054bc3c655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/472aba2603ca74c4f7722cb0c0296942b0776b8d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7097a0280b178237265681be66d1bef11d15894b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/896a9512d0d83c2a4b357e5585b7b62a8e3f95c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92d3817649df2b0b6a008a686c8275c88d7ef594"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba353caafb06ccee57b78d3254e3cebf1dea4a93"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6a13ae00dab3a1a8c7cf2f843f0fc9e8d4b0ccc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e451a904606c571f731ef7a06b3398619dce5300"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.