GHSA-4HQC-3J39-58MH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-06 18:31 – Updated: 2025-03-06 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Reject struct_ops registration that uses module ptr and the module btf_id is missing

There is a UAF report in the bpf_struct_ops when CONFIG_MODULES=n. In particular, the report is on tcp_congestion_ops that has a "struct module *owner" member.

For struct_ops that has a "struct module *owner" member, it can be extended either by the regular kernel module or by the bpf_struct_ops. bpf_try_module_get() will be used to do the refcounting and different refcount is done based on the owner pointer. When CONFIG_MODULES=n, the btf_id of the "struct module" is missing:

WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol module

Thus, the bpf_try_module_get() cannot do the correct refcounting.

Not all subsystem's struct_ops requires the "struct module *owner" member. e.g. the recent sched_ext_ops.

This patch is to disable bpf_struct_ops registration if the struct_ops has the "struct module *" member and the "struct module" btf_id is missing. The btf_type_is_fwd() helper is moved to the btf.h header file for this test.

This has happened since the beginning of bpf_struct_ops which has gone through many changes. The Fixes tag is set to a recent commit that this patch can apply cleanly. Considering CONFIG_MODULES=n is not common and the age of the issue, targeting for bpf-next also.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-58060"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-06T16:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject struct_ops registration that uses module ptr and the module btf_id is missing\n\nThere is a UAF report in the bpf_struct_ops when CONFIG_MODULES=n.\nIn particular, the report is on tcp_congestion_ops that has\na \"struct module *owner\" member.\n\nFor struct_ops that has a \"struct module *owner\" member,\nit can be extended either by the regular kernel module or\nby the bpf_struct_ops. bpf_try_module_get() will be used\nto do the refcounting and different refcount is done\nbased on the owner pointer. When CONFIG_MODULES=n,\nthe btf_id of the \"struct module\" is missing:\n\nWARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol module\n\nThus, the bpf_try_module_get() cannot do the correct refcounting.\n\nNot all subsystem\u0027s struct_ops requires the \"struct module *owner\" member.\ne.g. the recent sched_ext_ops.\n\nThis patch is to disable bpf_struct_ops registration if\nthe struct_ops has the \"struct module *\" member and the\n\"struct module\" btf_id is missing. The btf_type_is_fwd() helper\nis moved to the btf.h header file for this test.\n\nThis has happened since the beginning of bpf_struct_ops which has gone\nthrough many changes. The Fixes tag is set to a recent commit that this\npatch can apply cleanly. Considering CONFIG_MODULES=n is not\ncommon and the age of the issue, targeting for bpf-next also.",
  "id": "GHSA-4hqc-3j39-58mh",
  "modified": "2025-03-06T18:31:09Z",
  "published": "2025-03-06T18:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58060"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2324fb4e92092837ee278fdd8d60c48ee1a619ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96ea081ed52bf077cad6d00153b6fba68e510767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b777b14c2a4a4e2322daf8e8ffd42d2b88831b17"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.