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GHSA-4FVG-C4GX-GXG2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio: rtc: tear down old virtqueues before restore

virtio_device_restore() resets the device and restores the negotiated features before calling ->restore(). viortc_freeze() intentionally leaves the existing virtqueues in place so the alarm queue can still wake the system, but viortc_restore() immediately calls viortc_init_vqs() without first deleting those old queues.

If virtqueue reinitialization fails on virtio-pci, the transport error path can run vp_del_vqs() against a newly allocated vp_dev->vqs array while vdev->vqs still contains the old virtqueues. vp_del_vqs() then looks up queue state through the new array and can dereference a NULL info pointer in vp_del_vq(), crashing the guest kernel during restore.

This can also happen during a non-faulty reinitialization, when one of the vp_find_vqs_msix() attempts is unsuccessful before a later attempt would succeed.

Delete the stale virtqueues before rebuilding them. If restore fails before virtio_device_ready(), reuse the remove path to stop the device. Once the device is ready, return errors directly instead of deleting the virtqueues again.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio: rtc: tear down old virtqueues before restore\n\nvirtio_device_restore() resets the device and restores the negotiated\nfeatures before calling -\u003erestore(). viortc_freeze() intentionally\nleaves the existing virtqueues in place so the alarm queue can still\nwake the system, but viortc_restore() immediately calls\nviortc_init_vqs() without first deleting those old queues.\n\nIf virtqueue reinitialization fails on virtio-pci, the transport error\npath can run vp_del_vqs() against a newly allocated vp_dev-\u003evqs array\nwhile vdev-\u003evqs still contains the old virtqueues. vp_del_vqs() then\nlooks up queue state through the new array and can dereference a NULL\ninfo pointer in vp_del_vq(), crashing the guest kernel during restore.\n\nThis can also happen during a non-faulty reinitialization, when one of\nthe vp_find_vqs_msix() attempts is unsuccessful before a later attempt\nwould succeed.\n\nDelete the stale virtqueues before rebuilding them. If restore fails\nbefore virtio_device_ready(), reuse the remove path to stop the device.\nOnce the device is ready, return errors directly instead of deleting the\nvirtqueues again.",
  "id": "GHSA-4fvg-c4gx-gxg2",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:37Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/548d2208455f14e6121404c6e30e997bfe0cd264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79366023aa891ca31376021a7bccff6384ca1ff1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aebebd1e9d70b650fc9e877082e0134edcf511da"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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