GHSA-4CWQ-J7JV-QMWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 00:39 – Updated: 2025-12-02 00:39Summary
An IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerability in the Grav CMS Admin Panel allows low-privilege users to access sensitive information from other accounts. Although direct account takeover is not possible, admin email addresses and other metadata can be exposed, increasing the risk of phishing, credential stuffing, and social engineering.
Details
- Endpoint:
/admin/accounts/users/{username} - Tested Version: Grav Admin 1.7.48
- Affected Accounts: Authenticated users with 0 privileges (non-privileged accounts)
Description:
Requesting another user’s account details (e.g., /admin/accounts/users/admin) as a low-privilege user returns an HTTP 403 Forbidden response.
However, sensitive information such as the admin’s email address is still present in the response source, specifically in the <title> tag.
system/src/Grav/Common/Flex/Types/Users/UserCollection.php
system/blueprints/flex/user-accounts.yaml
This is a classic IDOR vulnerability, where object references (usernames) are not properly protected from unauthorized enumeration.
PoC
- Log in as a non-privileged user (0-privilege account).
- Access another user’s endpoint, for example:
GET /admin/accounts/users/admin
3. Observe the HTTP 403 Forbidden response.
4. Inspect the page source; sensitive data such as the admin email can be seen in the <title> tag.
PoC Video:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lY_qwqSkN5sPNmHvXGOk6R1mdIgVt71H/view
Impact
- Type: Information Disclosure via IDOR
- Who is impacted: Low-privilege authenticated users can enumerate other accounts and extract sensitive metadata (admin emails).
- Risk: Exposed information can be used for targeted phishing, credential stuffing, brute-force attacks, or social engineering campaigns.
- Severity Justification: Only a low-privilege account is required, and sensitive metadata is leaked. Arbitrary code execution is not possible, but the information exposure is moderate risk.
Disclosure & CVE Request
- We request a CVE ID for this vulnerability once validated.
-
Please credit the discovery to:
-
Elvin Nuruyev
- Kanan Farzalili
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.0-beta.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66306"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T00:39:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T22:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## **Summary**\n\nAn **IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)** vulnerability in the Grav CMS Admin Panel allows **low-privilege users to access sensitive information** from other accounts.\nAlthough direct account takeover is not possible, **admin email addresses and other metadata can be exposed**, increasing the risk of phishing, credential stuffing, and social engineering.\n\n---\n\n## **Details**\n\n* **Endpoint:** `/admin/accounts/users/{username}`\n* **Tested Version:** Grav Admin 1.7.48\n* **Affected Accounts:** Authenticated users with **0 privileges** (non-privileged accounts)\n\n**Description:**\nRequesting another user\u2019s account details (e.g., `/admin/accounts/users/admin`) as a low-privilege user returns an HTTP **403 Forbidden** response.\nHowever, sensitive information such as the **admin\u2019s email address** is still present in the **response source**, specifically in the `\u003ctitle\u003e` tag.\n\n**system/src/Grav/Common/Flex/Types/Users/UserCollection.php**\n\u003cimg width=\"700\" height=\"327\" alt=\"Screenshot 2025-08-24 021027\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7e69ae49-d8fc-442f-b00c-9efaec706b2e\" /\u003e\n\n**system/blueprints/flex/user-accounts.yaml**\n\u003cimg width=\"700\" height=\"300\" alt=\"Screenshot 2025-08-24 020521\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/756631c8-d60b-4b84-a08a-2a9c2f81b41f\" /\u003e\n\n\nThis is a classic **IDOR vulnerability**, where object references (usernames) are not properly protected from unauthorized enumeration.\n\n---\n\n## **PoC**\n\n1. Log in as a **non-privileged user** (0-privilege account).\n2. Access another user\u2019s endpoint, for example:\n\n ```\n GET /admin/accounts/users/admin\n ```\n3. Observe the HTTP **403 Forbidden** response.\n4. Inspect the **page source**; sensitive data such as the **admin email** can be seen in the `\u003ctitle\u003e` tag.\n\n**PoC Video:** \n\n[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lY_qwqSkN5sPNmHvXGOk6R1mdIgVt71H/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lY_qwqSkN5sPNmHvXGOk6R1mdIgVt71H/view)\n\n---\n\n## **Impact**\n\n* **Type:** Information Disclosure via IDOR\n* **Who is impacted:** Low-privilege authenticated users can enumerate other accounts and extract sensitive metadata (admin emails).\n* **Risk:** Exposed information can be used for targeted phishing, credential stuffing, brute-force attacks, or social engineering campaigns.\n* **Severity Justification:** Only a low-privilege account is required, and sensitive metadata is leaked. Arbitrary code execution is not possible, but the information exposure is **moderate risk**.\n\n---\n\n## **Disclosure \u0026 CVE Request**\n\n* We request a **CVE ID** for this vulnerability once validated.\n* Please credit the discovery to:\n\n * **Elvin Nuruyev**\n * **Kanan Farzalili**",
"id": "GHSA-4cwq-j7jv-qmwg",
"modified": "2025-12-02T00:39:01Z",
"published": "2025-12-02T00:39:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-4cwq-j7jv-qmwg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66306"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/b7e1958a6e807ac14919447b60e5204a2ea77f62"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Grav vulnerable to Information Disclosure via IDOR in Grav Admin Panel"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.