GHSA-4CRX-J28M-6WRF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt()

packet_rcv_spkt() restores the link layer header with

skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));

That subtraction is only meaningful when the device actually has a link layer header. packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() both wrap it in dev_has_header(), which is also the predicate the block comment at the top of the file states the restore in terms of; packet_rcv_spkt() does not. commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices without visible hard header") introduced the helper and changed the two call sites, and this one stayed behind.

A device without a visible ll header can leave skb->mac_header at the 0xFFFF sentinel that _alloc_skb() initialises it to. A CAN skb does: init_can_skb() sets pkt_type and ip_summed but does not reset the headers, and commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure") dropped the skb_reset*_header() calls that used to be there. skb_mac_header() is then 0xFFFF, the length becomes a large negative number and skb_push() reports it through skb_under_panic() -- from softirq context, so it is a full system panic even with panic_on_oops=0:

skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8bd21bc1 len:-65455 put:-65471 head:... data:... tail:0x50 end:0x180 dev:can0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x50/0x60 Call Trace: skb_push+0x38/0x40 packet_rcv_spkt+0xe1/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x7e8/0xd30 ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

The socket type is reachable: packet_create() accepts SOCK_PACKET alongside SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM behind the same CAP_NET_RAW check, and neither the socket length nor a capability check keeps it away from a CAN interface.

The missing skb_reset_*_header() calls in init_can_skb() are a regression in their own right and are being fixed separately, but a packet socket should not turn a link layer that did not initialise its mac header into a kernel panic. Guard the push the way the other two receive paths do.

Tested on v7.3-rc5 under QEMU with a slcan device on a pty, which is the driver RX path: vcan does not reproduce it, because can_send() resets the headers on the way out. One SOCK_PACKET socket bound to can0 and one frame written into the line discipline panics an unpatched kernel with the trace above; the same image with this patch prints no panic and powers off normally. Both kernels are this tree, defconfig plus CONFIG_CAN_SLCAN=y, differing only in this hunk.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99033"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:26Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt()\n\npacket_rcv_spkt() restores the link layer header with\n\n\tskb_push(skb, skb-\u003edata - skb_mac_header(skb));\n\nThat subtraction is only meaningful when the device actually has a link\nlayer header.  packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() both wrap it in\ndev_has_header(), which is also the predicate the block comment at the\ntop of the file states the restore in terms of; packet_rcv_spkt() does\nnot.  commit d549699048b4 (\"net/packet: fix packet receive on L3\ndevices without visible hard header\") introduced the helper and changed\nthe two call sites, and this one stayed behind.\n\nA device without a visible ll header can leave skb-\u003emac_header at the\n0xFFFF sentinel that __alloc_skb() initialises it to.  A CAN skb does:\ninit_can_skb() sets pkt_type and ip_summed but does not reset the\nheaders, and commit 9f10374bb024 (\"can: remove private CAN skb\nheadroom infrastructure\") dropped the skb_reset_*_header() calls that\nused to be there.  skb_mac_header() is then 0xFFFF, the length becomes\na large negative number and skb_push() reports it through\nskb_under_panic() -- from softirq context, so it is a full system panic\neven with panic_on_oops=0:\n\n  skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8bd21bc1 len:-65455 put:-65471 head:... data:... tail:0x50 end:0x180 dev:can0\n  kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!\n  RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x50/0x60\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cIRQ\u003e\n   skb_push+0x38/0x40\n   packet_rcv_spkt+0xe1/0x170\n   __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x7e8/0xd30\n   ...\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nThe socket type is reachable: packet_create() accepts SOCK_PACKET\nalongside SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM behind the same CAP_NET_RAW check,\nand neither the socket length nor a capability check keeps it away\nfrom a CAN interface.\n\nThe missing skb_reset_*_header() calls in init_can_skb() are a\nregression in their own right and are being fixed separately, but a\npacket socket should not turn a link layer that did not initialise its\nmac header into a kernel panic.  Guard the push the way the other two\nreceive paths do.\n\nTested on v7.3-rc5 under QEMU with a slcan device on a pty, which is\nthe driver RX path: vcan does not reproduce it, because can_send()\nresets the headers on the way out.  One SOCK_PACKET socket bound to\ncan0 and one frame written into the line discipline panics an\nunpatched kernel with the trace above; the same image with this patch\nprints no panic and powers off normally.  Both kernels are this tree,\ndefconfig plus CONFIG_CAN_SLCAN=y, differing only in this hunk.",
  "id": "GHSA-4crx-j28m-6wrf",
  "modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T15:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00fbf71e74115f7628fc0880b855434b1e70c40c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28bc1ef699610ee09ce3d46a00552f5a0a0144bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31c7b15b3716e8d0dad58d2c3cdf321dfd06f4be"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3efe0e0944157fdd2072b4dc7eb0491a317ed272"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8a24b9e1774a93943caf68d48c5e17be432220b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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