GHSA-4C8G-JVCX-V4HV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:04 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:01Summary
In Deno, environment access is gated by the env permission. You can deny it
with --deny-env, or restrict it to a specific allowlist with
--allow-env=FOO,BAR. The expectation is that a program running without env
permission cannot change process.env.
process.loadEnvFile() (the Node-compatible API for loading variables from a
.env file) does not honor this. It only checks that the program has
read permission for the dotenv file, then writes every key in that file
into the process environment — even when env access is denied.
In effect, --allow-read plus a writable or attacker-controlled .env file
is enough to defeat --deny-env.
Am I affected?
You are potentially affected if all of the following are true:
- You run Deno v2.3.0 or newer.
- Your program (or any dependency it imports) calls
process.loadEnvFile()fromnode:process. - You rely on Deno's permission model — specifically
--deny-env, an--allow-env=…allowlist, or running without grantingenv— as a security boundary. - The
.envpath passed toloadEnvFile()can be controlled or modified by a less-trusted party (untrusted input, user-writable directory, third-party dependency, etc.) and is covered by your--allow-readgrant.
If your program does not use process.loadEnvFile() at all, or if it already
grants full env access, this advisory does not change your risk.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49983"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:04:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn Deno, environment access is gated by the `env` permission. You can deny it\nwith `--deny-env`, or restrict it to a specific allowlist with\n`--allow-env=FOO,BAR`. The expectation is that a program running without `env`\npermission cannot change `process.env`.\n\n`process.loadEnvFile()` (the Node-compatible API for loading variables from a\n`.env` file) does **not** honor this. It only checks that the program has\n**read** permission for the dotenv file, then writes every key in that file\ninto the process environment \u2014 even when `env` access is denied.\n\nIn effect, **`--allow-read` plus a writable or attacker-controlled `.env` file\nis enough to defeat `--deny-env`.**\n\n## Am I affected?\n\nYou are potentially affected if **all** of the following are true:\n\n1. You run Deno **v2.3.0 or newer**.\n2. Your program (or any dependency it imports) calls `process.loadEnvFile()`\n from `node:process`.\n3. You rely on Deno\u0027s permission model \u2014 specifically `--deny-env`, an\n `--allow-env=\u2026` allowlist, or running without granting `env` \u2014 as a\n security boundary.\n4. The `.env` path passed to `loadEnvFile()` can be controlled or modified by\n a less-trusted party (untrusted input, user-writable directory, third-party\n dependency, etc.) and is covered by your `--allow-read` grant.\n\nIf your program does not use `process.loadEnvFile()` at all, or if it already\ngrants full `env` access, this advisory does not change your risk.",
"id": "GHSA-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:01:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T19:04:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49983"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deno: process.loadEnvFile() bypasses env permission checks and mutates process.env with only read access"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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