GHSA-49R8-JP3J-22RH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-03 09:30 – Updated: 2025-11-20 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: avoid using multiple devices with different type
For multiple devices, both primary and extra devices should be the
same type. erofs_init_device has already guaranteed that if the
primary is a file-backed device, extra devices should also be
regular files.
However, if the primary is a block device while the extra device
is a file-backed device, erofs_init_device will get an ENOTBLK,
which is not treated as an error in erofs_fc_get_tree, and that
leads to an UAF:
erofs_fc_get_tree get_tree_bdev_flags(erofs_fc_fill_super) erofs_read_superblock erofs_init_device // sbi->dif0 is not inited yet, // return -ENOTBLK deactivate_locked_super free(sbi) if (err is -ENOTBLK) sbi->dif0.file = filp_open() // sbi UAF
So if -ENOTBLK is hitted in erofs_init_device, it means the
primary device must be a block device, and the extra device
is not a block device. The error can be converted to -EINVAL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38172"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-03T09:15:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nerofs: avoid using multiple devices with different type\n\nFor multiple devices, both primary and extra devices should be the\nsame type. `erofs_init_device` has already guaranteed that if the\nprimary is a file-backed device, extra devices should also be\nregular files.\n\nHowever, if the primary is a block device while the extra device\nis a file-backed device, `erofs_init_device` will get an ENOTBLK,\nwhich is not treated as an error in `erofs_fc_get_tree`, and that\nleads to an UAF:\n\n erofs_fc_get_tree\n get_tree_bdev_flags(erofs_fc_fill_super)\n erofs_read_superblock\n erofs_init_device // sbi-\u003edif0 is not inited yet,\n // return -ENOTBLK\n deactivate_locked_super\n free(sbi)\n if (err is -ENOTBLK)\n sbi-\u003edif0.file = filp_open() // sbi UAF\n\nSo if -ENOTBLK is hitted in `erofs_init_device`, it means the\nprimary device must be a block device, and the extra device\nis not a block device. The error can be converted to -EINVAL.",
"id": "GHSA-49r8-jp3j-22rh",
"modified": "2025-11-20T21:30:30Z",
"published": "2025-07-03T09:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65115472f741ca000d7ea4a5922214f93cd1516e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9748f2f54f66743ac77275c34886a9f890e18409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd04beb9ce2773a16057248bb4fa424068ae3807"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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