GHSA-49MW-7VR5-F369
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue
The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.
inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int. If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.
This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace, raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().
Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of legitimate traffic.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99709"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ninet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue\n\nThe truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by\nthe per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.\n\ninet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int.\nIf this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc\nadjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own\nreference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.\n\nThis can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace,\nraising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep\na large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().\n\nTrack the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse\na fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill\nthe queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of\nlegitimate traffic.",
"id": "GHSA-49mw-7vr5-f369",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ae20e4697eb969104fe4b1e98a675f0100382b6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7f84486c44c2ce03dffe5f09a42a38acbaa1551"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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