GHSA-484M-2C5W-2G38

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: make calc_target() set t->paused, not just clear it

Currently calc_target() clears t->paused if the request shouldn't be paused anymore, but doesn't ever set t->paused even though it's able to determine when the request should be paused. Setting t->paused is left to __submit_request() which is fine for regular requests but doesn't work for linger requests -- since __submit_request() doesn't operate on linger requests, there is nowhere for lreq->t.paused to be set. One consequence of this is that watches don't get reestablished on paused -> unpaused transitions in cases where requests have been paused long enough for the (paused) unwatch request to time out and for the subsequent (re)watch request to enter the paused state. On top of the watch not getting reestablished, rbd_reregister_watch() gets stuck with rbd_dev->watch_mutex held:

rbd_register_watch __rbd_register_watch ceph_osdc_watch linger_reg_commit_wait

It's waiting for lreq->reg_commit_wait to be completed, but for that to happen the respective request needs to end up on need_resend_linger list and be kicked when requests are unpaused. There is no chance for that if the request in question is never marked paused in the first place.

The fact that rbd_dev->watch_mutex remains taken out forever then prevents the image from getting unmapped -- "rbd unmap" would inevitably hang in D state on an attempt to grab the mutex.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23047"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T16:16:20Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: make calc_target() set t-\u003epaused, not just clear it\n\nCurrently calc_target() clears t-\u003epaused if the request shouldn\u0027t be\npaused anymore, but doesn\u0027t ever set t-\u003epaused even though it\u0027s able to\ndetermine when the request should be paused.  Setting t-\u003epaused is left\nto __submit_request() which is fine for regular requests but doesn\u0027t\nwork for linger requests -- since __submit_request() doesn\u0027t operate\non linger requests, there is nowhere for lreq-\u003et.paused to be set.\nOne consequence of this is that watches don\u0027t get reestablished on\npaused -\u003e unpaused transitions in cases where requests have been paused\nlong enough for the (paused) unwatch request to time out and for the\nsubsequent (re)watch request to enter the paused state.  On top of the\nwatch not getting reestablished, rbd_reregister_watch() gets stuck with\nrbd_dev-\u003ewatch_mutex held:\n\n  rbd_register_watch\n    __rbd_register_watch\n      ceph_osdc_watch\n        linger_reg_commit_wait\n\nIt\u0027s waiting for lreq-\u003ereg_commit_wait to be completed, but for that to\nhappen the respective request needs to end up on need_resend_linger list\nand be kicked when requests are unpaused.  There is no chance for that\nif the request in question is never marked paused in the first place.\n\nThe fact that rbd_dev-\u003ewatch_mutex remains taken out forever then\nprevents the image from getting unmapped -- \"rbd unmap\" would inevitably\nhang in D state on an attempt to grab the mutex.",
  "id": "GHSA-484m-2c5w-2g38",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T18:30:41Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T18:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b3329b3c29d9e188e40d902d5230c2d5989b940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d3399c52e0e61720ae898f5a0b5b75d4460ae24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ebc711b738d139cabe2fc9e7e7749847676a342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5647d42c47b535573b63e073e91164d6a5bb058c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d0dc83cb9a69c1d0bea58f1c430199b05f6b021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f468f6ff233c6a81e0e761d9124e982903fe9a5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0fe2994f9a9d0a2ec9e42441ea5ba74b6a16176"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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