GHSA-47VM-9F65-QWHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-09 03:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf tool x86: Fix perf_env memory leak
Found by leak sanitizer:
==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369
#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465
#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14
#4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83
#5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366
#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108
#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112
#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236
#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265
#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402
#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559
#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323
#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377
#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421
#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537
#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53793"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T01:16:50Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf tool x86: Fix perf_env memory leak\n\nFound by leak sanitizer:\n```\n==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks\n\nDirect leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:\n #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439\n #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369\n #2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465\n #3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14\n #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83\n #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366\n #6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108\n #7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112\n #8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236\n #9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265\n #10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402\n #11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559\n #12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323\n #13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377\n #14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421\n #15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537\n #16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).\n```",
"id": "GHSA-47vm-9f65-qwhr",
"modified": "2025-12-09T03:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T03:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/010139bfc6bb9ddab81dbc2cf71cd3a9c28adc7f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75d65c1cc439606ada882755fd205d13c2c7907d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99d4850062a84564f36923764bb93935ef2ed108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3daf02a41e3c11e1a473517a8a6169248fb8e7b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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