GHSA-42JX-Q75F-J6J5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: fix session reference leak on compounded SESSION_SETUP

A compound request can place SESSION_SETUP after another command. That earlier command leaves a reference to its session in work->sess. smb2_sess_setup() then overwrites work->sess with the session it looks up or creates, and the dispatcher later puts work->sess only once. The inherited reference is never dropped. That leaks the session, together with its setup connection and socket, and every repeat of the compound leaks another.

unreferenced object (size 512): __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x32c/0x3a0 ksmbd_smb2_session_create+0xf6/0x9c0 [ksmbd] smb2_sess_setup+0xda4/0x6280 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x88c/0x1cb0 [ksmbd]

Save the inherited session on entry. After the request has been processed, release it once, but only when smb2_sess_setup() has replaced work->sess with its own session or cleared it. Do this after ksmbd_conn_unlock() so the put does not run under srv_mutex. An error path may instead leave the inherited session in work->sess. Keep it there, so the dispatcher still puts it and the error response is still signed or encrypted with it as before.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99539"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:09Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix session reference leak on compounded SESSION_SETUP\n\nA compound request can place SESSION_SETUP after another command. That\nearlier command leaves a reference to its session in work-\u003esess.\nsmb2_sess_setup() then overwrites work-\u003esess with the session it looks up\nor creates, and the dispatcher later puts work-\u003esess only once. The\ninherited reference is never dropped. That leaks the session, together\nwith its setup connection and socket, and every repeat of the compound\nleaks another.\n\n  unreferenced object (size 512):\n    __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x32c/0x3a0\n    ksmbd_smb2_session_create+0xf6/0x9c0 [ksmbd]\n    smb2_sess_setup+0xda4/0x6280 [ksmbd]\n    handle_ksmbd_work+0x88c/0x1cb0 [ksmbd]\n\nSave the inherited session on entry. After the request has been\nprocessed, release it once, but only when smb2_sess_setup() has replaced\nwork-\u003esess with its own session or cleared it. Do this after\nksmbd_conn_unlock() so the put does not run under srv_mutex. An error path\nmay instead leave the inherited session in work-\u003esess. Keep it there, so\nthe dispatcher still puts it and the error response is still signed or\nencrypted with it as before.",
  "id": "GHSA-42jx-q75f-j6j5",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99539"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03bd8f5279e490e15e0c0f0fa388ffbd2fbacd65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38cddb9f7c9102f23652d198748c658072cf0df5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2d710b12e86fd4cf02be090651fa6ea8683fc29"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db30f8f330fc73304edfe595dc5a6f5e17ba97f2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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