GHSA-42G7-HF2F-VFR8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type
Patch series "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata", v2.
This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so malformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them into the in-core inode.
The checks cover:
- i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file type;
- non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and
- non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on non-sparse volumes.
The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The online filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its own reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error().
This patch (of 3):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value. ocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode->i_mode and dispatches on i_mode & S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file iops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and init_special_inode().
Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical POSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type conversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the accepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of open-coding a local switch.
Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path. filecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode through the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type\n\nPatch series \"ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata\", v2.\n\nThis series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so\nmalformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies\nthem into the in-core inode.\n\nThe checks cover:\n\n - i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file\n type;\n - non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and\n - non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is\n zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on\n non-sparse volumes.\n\nThe normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the\nexisting suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The\nonline filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its\nown reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead\nof calling ocfs2_error().\n\n\nThis patch (of 3):\n\nocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value. \nocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode-\u003ei_mode\nand dispatches on i_mode \u0026 S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file\niops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and\ninit_special_inode().\n\nReject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical\nPOSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type\nconversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the\naccepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of\nopen-coding a local switch.\n\nApply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path. \nfilecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode\nthrough the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of\ncalling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed\ninto ocfs2_populate_inode().",
"id": "GHSA-42g7-hf2f-vfr8",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/157d31ef45038d89cd19620105e082d43c8e41e0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e3aac33988ef4e4170141db8e995693ea38357c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4db3b6a2a8ecf2a89d26a4090ace4072c6fad050"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5366a017099c6a3c443be908a05f26fd72af12a1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82afe13558354390d8a592a5334d5f4fd72c0e5c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5b555bcabbb0aff8745ad181768eaf9d964c1ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b858f2d57cfc9d57ce61b86051d603dc0ebccd40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb024ea29f6cb1f01745e5f2e31646f3acb9aa6f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
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Nomenclature
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