GHSA-42C7-W7R7-3V3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-19 18:31 – Updated: 2024-11-27 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Be stricter about IO mapping flags
The current panthor_device_mmap_io() implementation has two issues:
-
For mapping DRM_PANTHOR_USER_FLUSH_ID_MMIO_OFFSET, panthor_device_mmap_io() bails if VM_WRITE is set, but does not clear VM_MAYWRITE. That means userspace can use mprotect() to make the mapping writable later on. This is a classic Linux driver gotcha. I don't think this actually has any impact in practice: When the GPU is powered, writes to the FLUSH_ID seem to be ignored; and when the GPU is not powered, the dummy_latest_flush page provided by the driver is deliberately designed to not do any flushes, so the only thing writing to the dummy_latest_flush could achieve would be to make more flushes happen.
-
panthor_device_mmap_io() does not block MAP_PRIVATE mappings (which are mappings without the VM_SHARED flag). MAP_PRIVATE in combination with VM_MAYWRITE indicates that the VMA has copy-on-write semantics, which for VM_PFNMAP are semi-supported but fairly cursed. In particular, in such a mapping, the driver can only install PTEs during mmap() by calling remap_pfn_range() (because remap_pfn_range() wants to store the physical address of the mapped physical memory into the vm_pgoff of the VMA); installing PTEs later on with a fault handler (as panthor does) is not supported in private mappings, and so if you try to fault in such a mapping, vmf_insert_pfn_prot() splats when it hits a BUG() check.
Fix it by clearing the VM_MAYWRITE flag (userspace writing to the FLUSH_ID doesn't make sense) and requiring VM_SHARED (copy-on-write semantics for the FLUSH_ID don't make sense).
Reproducers for both scenarios are in the notes of my patch on the mailing list; I tested that these bugs exist on a Rock 5B machine.
Note that I only compile-tested the patch, I haven't tested it; I don't have a working kernel build setup for the test machine yet. Please test it before applying it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-19T18:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/panthor: Be stricter about IO mapping flags\n\nThe current panthor_device_mmap_io() implementation has two issues:\n\n1. For mapping DRM_PANTHOR_USER_FLUSH_ID_MMIO_OFFSET,\n panthor_device_mmap_io() bails if VM_WRITE is set, but does not clear\n VM_MAYWRITE. That means userspace can use mprotect() to make the mapping\n writable later on. This is a classic Linux driver gotcha.\n I don\u0027t think this actually has any impact in practice:\n When the GPU is powered, writes to the FLUSH_ID seem to be ignored; and\n when the GPU is not powered, the dummy_latest_flush page provided by the\n driver is deliberately designed to not do any flushes, so the only thing\n writing to the dummy_latest_flush could achieve would be to make *more*\n flushes happen.\n\n2. panthor_device_mmap_io() does not block MAP_PRIVATE mappings (which are\n mappings without the VM_SHARED flag).\n MAP_PRIVATE in combination with VM_MAYWRITE indicates that the VMA has\n copy-on-write semantics, which for VM_PFNMAP are semi-supported but\n fairly cursed.\n In particular, in such a mapping, the driver can only install PTEs\n during mmap() by calling remap_pfn_range() (because remap_pfn_range()\n wants to **store the physical address of the mapped physical memory into\n the vm_pgoff of the VMA**); installing PTEs later on with a fault\n handler (as panthor does) is not supported in private mappings, and so\n if you try to fault in such a mapping, vmf_insert_pfn_prot() splats when\n it hits a BUG() check.\n\nFix it by clearing the VM_MAYWRITE flag (userspace writing to the FLUSH_ID\ndoesn\u0027t make sense) and requiring VM_SHARED (copy-on-write semantics for\nthe FLUSH_ID don\u0027t make sense).\n\nReproducers for both scenarios are in the notes of my patch on the mailing\nlist; I tested that these bugs exist on a Rock 5B machine.\n\nNote that I only compile-tested the patch, I haven\u0027t tested it; I don\u0027t\nhave a working kernel build setup for the test machine yet. Please test it\nbefore applying it.",
"id": "GHSA-42c7-w7r7-3v3m",
"modified": "2024-11-27T00:31:41Z",
"published": "2024-11-19T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2604afd65043e8f9d4be036cb1242adf6b5723cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f432a1621f049bb207e78363d9d0e3c6fa2da5db"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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