GHSA-424V-XJH8-RWF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: do not copy up a dentry that was removed
A change to a removed file through an open descriptor replaces whatever has its old name in the upper layer.
Copy up must only create a name in the upper directory, never replace one. After an unlink, an rmdir or a rename over a lower dentry, a dentry that an open file keeps alive still has its old parent and name, but in the upper directory that name is now a whiteout or a new object. ovl_copy_up_workdir() renames the copy over it, which brings back the removed object and destroys whatever took its name.
An unprivileged user opened a lower FIFO and unlinked it, root created a file at that name, and fchmod on the old descriptor replaced the file of root with the FIFO.
Fix this by looking up the target name of the rename in ovl_copy_up_workdir() with LOOKUP_EXCL, so that copy up fails with -EEXIST if the name is taken, as copy up with O_TMPFILE already does when it links the copy to the name.
[amir: use LOOKUP_EXCL instead of relying on d_unhashed()]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99419"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: do not copy up a dentry that was removed\n\nA change to a removed file through an open descriptor replaces whatever\nhas its old name in the upper layer.\n\nCopy up must only create a name in the upper directory, never replace\none. After an unlink, an rmdir or a rename over a lower dentry, a\ndentry that an open file keeps alive still has its old parent and name,\nbut in the upper directory that name is now a whiteout or a new object.\novl_copy_up_workdir() renames the copy over it, which brings back the\nremoved object and destroys whatever took its name.\n\nAn unprivileged user opened a lower FIFO and unlinked it, root created\na file at that name, and fchmod on the old descriptor replaced the file\nof root with the FIFO.\n\nFix this by looking up the target name of the rename in\novl_copy_up_workdir() with LOOKUP_EXCL, so that copy up fails with\n-EEXIST if the name is taken, as copy up with O_TMPFILE already does\nwhen it links the copy to the name.\n\n[amir: use LOOKUP_EXCL instead of relying on d_unhashed()]",
"id": "GHSA-424v-xjh8-rwf2",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99419"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0defa3e443bbdd38628f0b594809c52295836dec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9706fb79a9499f5a0f7d7f755b6bb9b14cc426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/383a883cf71525752a3092bba3c22aa1ab04df37"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f635192ad223d2009ee640b63adf5ce3198aa338"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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