GHSA-422J-5566-QW87
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-15 15:31 – Updated: 2025-12-04 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video/aperture: Call sysfb_disable() before removing PCI devices
Call sysfb_disable() from aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices() before removing PCI devices. Without, simpledrm can still bind to simple-framebuffer devices after the hardware driver has taken over the hardware. Both drivers interfere with each other and results are undefined.
Reported modesetting errors [1] are shown below.
---- snap ---- rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 13-.... } 7 jiffies s: 165 root: 0x2000/. rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug): Task dump for CPU 13: task:X state:R running task stack: 0 pid: 4242 ppid: 4228 flags:0x00000008 Call Trace: ? commit_tail+0xd7/0x130 ? drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x126/0x150 ? drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe0 ? drm_plane_get_damage_clips.cold+0x1c/0x1c ? drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb+0x19e/0x280 ? drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl+0x10f/0x1e0 ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0 ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x150 ? drm_ioctl+0x246/0x3f0 ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 ? do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0xb5 ... rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 13-.... } 30 jiffies s: 169 root: 0x2000/. rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug): Task dump for CPU 13: task:X state:R running task stack: 0 pid: 4242 ppid: 4228 flags:0x0000400e Call Trace: ? memcpy_toio+0x76/0xc0 ? memcpy_toio+0x1b/0xc0 ? drm_fb_memcpy_toio+0x76/0xb0 ? drm_fb_blit_toio+0x75/0x2b0 ? simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_update+0x132/0x150 ? drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0xb6/0x230 ? drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x44/0x80 ? commit_tail+0xd7/0x130 ? drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x126/0x150 ? drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe0 ? drm_plane_get_damage_clips.cold+0x1c/0x1c ? drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb+0x19e/0x280 ? drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl+0x10f/0x1e0 ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0 ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x150 ? drm_ioctl+0x246/0x3f0 ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 ? do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0xb5
The problem was added by commit 5e0137612430 ("video/aperture: Disable and unregister sysfb devices via aperture helpers") to v6.0.3 and does not exist in the mainline branch.
The mainline commit 5e0137612430 ("video/aperture: Disable and unregister sysfb devices via aperture helpers") has been backported from v6.0-rc1 to stable v6.0.3 from a larger patch series [2] that reworks fbdev framebuffer ownership. The backport misses a change to aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices(). Mainline itself is fine, because the function does not exist there as a result of the patch series.
Instead of backporting the whole series, fix the additional function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50332"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-15T15:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvideo/aperture: Call sysfb_disable() before removing PCI devices\n\nCall sysfb_disable() from aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices()\nbefore removing PCI devices. Without, simpledrm can still bind to\nsimple-framebuffer devices after the hardware driver has taken over\nthe hardware. Both drivers interfere with each other and results are\nundefined.\n\nReported modesetting errors [1] are shown below.\n\n---- snap ----\nrcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 13-.... } 7 jiffies s: 165 root: 0x2000/.\nrcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug):\nTask dump for CPU 13:\ntask:X state:R running task stack: 0 pid: 4242 ppid: 4228 flags:0x00000008\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? commit_tail+0xd7/0x130\n ? drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x126/0x150\n ? drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe0\n ? drm_plane_get_damage_clips.cold+0x1c/0x1c\n ? drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb+0x19e/0x280\n ? drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl+0x10f/0x1e0\n ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0\n ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x150\n ? drm_ioctl+0x246/0x3f0\n ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0\n ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0\n ? do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0\n ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0xb5\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n...\nrcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 13-.... } 30 jiffies s: 169 root: 0x2000/.\nrcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug):\nTask dump for CPU 13:\ntask:X state:R running task stack: 0 pid: 4242 ppid: 4228 flags:0x0000400e\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? memcpy_toio+0x76/0xc0\n ? memcpy_toio+0x1b/0xc0\n ? drm_fb_memcpy_toio+0x76/0xb0\n ? drm_fb_blit_toio+0x75/0x2b0\n ? simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_update+0x132/0x150\n ? drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0xb6/0x230\n ? drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x44/0x80\n ? commit_tail+0xd7/0x130\n ? drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x126/0x150\n ? drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe0\n ? drm_plane_get_damage_clips.cold+0x1c/0x1c\n ? drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb+0x19e/0x280\n ? drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl+0x10f/0x1e0\n ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0\n ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x150\n ? drm_ioctl+0x246/0x3f0\n ? drm_mode_getfb2_ioctl+0x2d0/0x2d0\n ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0\n ? do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0\n ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0xb5\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe problem was added by commit 5e0137612430 (\"video/aperture: Disable\nand unregister sysfb devices via aperture helpers\") to v6.0.3 and does\nnot exist in the mainline branch.\n\nThe mainline commit 5e0137612430 (\"video/aperture: Disable and\nunregister sysfb devices via aperture helpers\") has been backported\nfrom v6.0-rc1 to stable v6.0.3 from a larger patch series [2] that\nreworks fbdev framebuffer ownership. The backport misses a change to\naperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices(). Mainline itself is fine,\nbecause the function does not exist there as a result of the patch\nseries.\n\nInstead of backporting the whole series, fix the additional function.",
"id": "GHSA-422j-5566-qw87",
"modified": "2025-12-04T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2025-09-15T15:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25a6688f27ff54f97adf7cce1d7e18c38bf51eb4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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