Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-3XGC-Q8GM-M2RG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler

scx_hardlockup() defers the abort to an irq_work because exit claiming used to take scx_sched_lock and couldn't run from NMI. The deferral is now unnecessary - claiming is NMI-safe and asserting ->aborting is exactly what breaks the live-locks that hard-lock CPUs. Call handle_lockup() directly and drop the irq_work. This also makes the self-detected case recoverable: the perf watchdog fires on the hard-locked CPU itself, where a queued irq_work never runs with IRQs off.

Also fix the return value: %true used to be returned whenever sched_ext was loaded, suppressing the kernel's hardlockup report even when the abort was refused. Return %true only when this call initiated the abort.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90432"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:48Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler\n\nscx_hardlockup() defers the abort to an irq_work because exit claiming used\nto take scx_sched_lock and couldn\u0027t run from NMI. The deferral is now\nunnecessary - claiming is NMI-safe and asserting -\u003eaborting is exactly what\nbreaks the live-locks that hard-lock CPUs. Call handle_lockup() directly and\ndrop the irq_work. This also makes the self-detected case recoverable: the\nperf watchdog fires on the hard-locked CPU itself, where a queued irq_work\nnever runs with IRQs off.\n\nAlso fix the return value: %true used to be returned whenever sched_ext was\nloaded, suppressing the kernel\u0027s hardlockup report even when the abort was\nrefused. Return %true only when this call initiated the abort.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xgc-q8gm-m2rg",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:05Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90432"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c4b38064937a761ebbf85b1649e812db85eb59e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d6270bbb4e083a4d2d39f3c36f30f5c939c06ed"
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  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CVE-2026-90432 (GCVE-0-2026-90432)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 16:09 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:03

Title

sched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler scx_hardlockup() defers the abort to an irq_work because exit claiming used to take scx_sched_lock and couldn't run from NMI. The deferral is now unnecessary - claiming is NMI-safe and asserting ->aborting is exactly what breaks the live-locks that hard-lock CPUs. Call handle_lockup() directly and drop the irq_work. This also makes the self-detected case recoverable: the perf watchdog fires on the hard-locked CPU itself, where a queued irq_work never runs with IRQs off. Also fix the return value: %true used to be returned whenever sched_ext was loaded, suppressing the kernel's hardlockup report even when the abort was refused. Return %true only when this call initiated the abort.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6641 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d6270bbb4e083a4d…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c4b38064937a761e…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: bd2d76455b65aab77652823919db128a8e585825 , < 4d6270bbb4e083a4d2d39f3c36f30f5c939c06ed (git) Affected: bd2d76455b65aab77652823919db128a8e585825 , < 3c4b38064937a761ebbf85b1649e812db85eb59e (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 7.1 Unaffected: 0 , < 7.1 (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.6 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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JSON

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        {
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          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/sched/ext/ext.c"
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          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
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          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler\n\nscx_hardlockup() defers the abort to an irq_work because exit claiming used\nto take scx_sched_lock and couldn\u0027t run from NMI. The deferral is now\nunnecessary - claiming is NMI-safe and asserting -\u003eaborting is exactly what\nbreaks the live-locks that hard-lock CPUs. Call handle_lockup() directly and\ndrop the irq_work. This also makes the self-detected case recoverable: the\nperf watchdog fires on the hard-locked CPU itself, where a queued irq_work\nnever runs with IRQs off.\n\nAlso fix the return value: %true used to be returned whenever sched_ext was\nloaded, suppressing the kernel\u0027s hardlockup report even when the abort was\nrefused. Return %true only when this call initiated the abort."
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    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:09:52.429Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.815Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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