GHSA-3X6J-VQFR-GQQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: return early from a zero-length flush
SYNC_BO does not constrain its size, so a request for zero bytes reaches drm_clflush_virt_range(), which ends with an unconditional clflushopt(end - 1). For an empty range that is the byte before the mapping, and abo->mem.kva comes from vmap(), so the access lands in the guard page below the vmalloc area and faults:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd16fbbc70fff #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 1000 Comm: sync_bo_probe RIP: 0010:drm_clflush_virt_range+0x3c/0x70 Call Trace: amdxdna_drm_sync_bo_ioctl+0x124/0x430 [amdxdna] drm_ioctl+0x301/0x4c0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x115/0x2f0 do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x3d0
Any process that can open the render node can do this. Reproduced 3 of 3 times on a Strix Point NPU (1022:17f0), by calling SYNC_BO with size 0 on an AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE object. The import arm takes the same request but flushes the whole scatterlist, so it survives it.
Nothing needs flushing for an empty range, so answer before choosing a path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89978"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/amdxdna: return early from a zero-length flush\n\nSYNC_BO does not constrain its size, so a request for zero bytes reaches\ndrm_clflush_virt_range(), which ends with an unconditional\nclflushopt(end - 1). For an empty range that is the byte before the\nmapping, and abo-\u003emem.kva comes from vmap(), so the access lands in the\nguard page below the vmalloc area and faults:\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd16fbbc70fff\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 7 UID: 1000 Comm: sync_bo_probe\n RIP: 0010:drm_clflush_virt_range+0x3c/0x70\n Call Trace:\n amdxdna_drm_sync_bo_ioctl+0x124/0x430 [amdxdna]\n drm_ioctl+0x301/0x4c0\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x115/0x2f0\n do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x3d0\n\nAny process that can open the render node can do this. Reproduced 3 of 3\ntimes on a Strix Point NPU (1022:17f0), by calling SYNC_BO with size 0 on\nan AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE object. The import arm takes the same request but\nflushes the whole scatterlist, so it survives it.\n\nNothing needs flushing for an empty range, so answer before choosing a\npath.",
"id": "GHSA-3x6j-vqfr-gqqm",
"modified": "2026-09-16T12:30:43Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45962da5821d0a691f638ccb13842889156d8969"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc14753664240cedf669623b27ae9922b0618b25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f00def884a831dc49eb659dac2dd09dbfd21e67f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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