GHSA-3WX3-9XWG-38FF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Prevent rt6_insert_exception() for dying fib6_info.
Before the cited commit, fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() always set from->exception_bucket_flushed = 1 under rt6_exception_lock to prevent rt6_insert_exception() from inserting a new exception for a dying fib6_info.
The flag was replaced with the FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED bit stored in nh->rt6i_exception_bucket.
The problem is that now the bit is only set when the bucket is not NULL and fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() is called from fib6_nh_release() after fib6_ref has already reached zero.
If rt6_insert_exception() is called while the target fib6_info is being removed via fib6_purge_rt(), a new exception could be created successfully because rt6_flush_exceptions() no longer sets the bit.
This creates a reference cycle between the fib6_info and the exception route, leaking the fib6_info, its nexthop device, and all per-CPU routes in fib6_nh->rt6i_pcpu, which stalls netdev unregistration.
[ 34.680602] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 [ 44.920675] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 [ 55.176582] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68
Let's call fib6_drop_pcpu_from() before rt6_flush_exceptions(), to set fib6_destroying before rt6_exception_lock, and check f6i->fib6_destroying in rt6_insert_exception().
Note that FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED logic is dead and we can clean it up in net-next.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98598"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: Prevent rt6_insert_exception() for dying fib6_info.\n\nBefore the cited commit, fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() always set\nfrom-\u003eexception_bucket_flushed = 1 under rt6_exception_lock to\nprevent rt6_insert_exception() from inserting a new exception\nfor a dying fib6_info.\n\nThe flag was replaced with the FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED\nbit stored in nh-\u003ert6i_exception_bucket.\n\nThe problem is that now the bit is only set when the bucket\nis not NULL and fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() is called from\nfib6_nh_release() after fib6_ref has already reached zero.\n\nIf rt6_insert_exception() is called while the target fib6_info\nis being removed via fib6_purge_rt(), a new exception could be\ncreated successfully because rt6_flush_exceptions() no longer\nsets the bit.\n\nThis creates a reference cycle between the fib6_info and the\nexception route, leaking the fib6_info, its nexthop device,\nand all per-CPU routes in fib6_nh-\u003ert6i_pcpu, which stalls netdev\nunregistration.\n\n[ 34.680602] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68\n[ 44.920675] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68\n[ 55.176582] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68\n\nLet\u0027s call fib6_drop_pcpu_from() before rt6_flush_exceptions(),\nto set fib6_destroying before rt6_exception_lock, and check\nf6i-\u003efib6_destroying in rt6_insert_exception().\n\nNote that FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED logic is dead and\nwe can clean it up in net-next.",
"id": "GHSA-3wx3-9xwg-38ff",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:55Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98598"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0346ec2f080b40d95ed05b853bb9226289e75212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/649ffc76ed5483b2caf35ed90d3787538efc4e53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e03e77071e75ce726d877f0a4349a28b6e1f487a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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