GHSA-3W28-36P9-W929
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:33 – Updated: 2026-06-23 17:33Summary
The Jupyter Notebook (ipynb) sanitizer endpoint at POST /-/api/sanitize_ipynb allows arbitrary data: URIs without proper restrictions, potentially leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). The endpoint uses bluemonday.UGCPolicy() with p.AllowURLSchemes("data") which permits all data URI schemes including data:text/html, enabling attackers to inject malicious HTML/JavaScript. Additionally, the endpoint has no authentication middleware, allowing any registered user to exploit this vulnerability.
Severity
High
Affected Versions
All versions using the vulnerable endpoint
Vulnerability Details
- CVE ID: (To be assigned)
- Entry Point:
POST /-/api/sanitize_ipynb - Attack Vector: Network
- Authentication Required: No (only needs a registered user account)
Impact
An attacker with a registered user account can:
- Send malicious HTML containing
data:text/htmlURIs to the sanitization endpoint - Receive sanitized but attacker-controlled HTML in the response
- Execute arbitrary JavaScript in the attacker's browser context through XSS
- Potentially exploit other users if the sanitized output is rendered in their context
The vulnerability has higher severity because:
- No authentication required (only needs a registered user account)
- Unlike the safer pattern in
internal/markup/sanitizer.go:39which usesisSafeDataURIto only allow safe image MIME types, this endpoint allows ALL data URIs including HTML - The returned HTML can be used to craft XSS attacks
Proof of Concept
Attacker sends a POST request to the sanitization endpoint:
POST /-/api/sanitize_ipynb HTTP/1.1
Host: target.gogs.instance
Content-Type: text/plain
<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>">click</a>
The server returns the sanitized HTML with the data URI preserved:
<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>">click</a>
When this HTML is rendered in a browser, the JavaScript within the data URI will execute, leading to XSS.
Affected Component
File: internal/app/api.go:10-16
func ipynbSanitizer() *bluemonday.Policy {
p := bluemonday.UGCPolicy()
p.AllowAttrs("class", "data-prompt-number").OnElements("div")
p.AllowAttrs("class").OnElements("img")
p.AllowURLSchemes("data") // <-- VULNERABLE: allows all data URIs
return p
}
File: cmd/gogs/web.go:681-683 - No authentication middleware
m.Group("/-", func() {
m.Get("/metrics", app.MetricsFilter(), promhttp.Handler())
m.Group("/api", func() {
m.Post("/sanitize_ipynb", app.SanitizeIpynb()) // <-- No auth middleware
})
})
Root Cause
-
Unrestricted data URI scheme: The code at
internal/app/api.go:14usesp.AllowURLSchemes("data")without any restriction, unlike the safer implementation ininternal/markup/sanitizer.go:39which usesAllowURLSchemeWithCustomPolicy("data", isSafeDataURI)to only allow safe image MIME types. -
No authentication: The endpoint at
cmd/gogs/web.go:682does not have any authentication middleware applied, making it accessible to any registered user. -
Insufficient validation: The sanitization only removes dangerous tags/attributes but preserves data URIs, allowing
data:text/htmlpayloads to pass through.
Suggested Fix
Option 1: Use the same safe pattern as internal/markup/sanitizer.go
Replace p.AllowURLSchemes("data") with:
p.AllowURLSchemeWithCustomPolicy("data", isSafeDataURI)
Where isSafeDataURI is a function that only allows safe image MIME types (image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, etc.).
Option 2: Add authentication middleware
Apply appropriate authentication to the endpoint:
m.Post("/sanitize_ipynb", middleware.signIn, app.SanitizeIpynb())
Option 3: Disable data URI scheme entirely
If data URIs are not required for ipynb sanitization:
// Remove this line entirely:
// p.AllowURLSchemes("data")
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52816"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79",
"CWE-80"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:33:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Jupyter Notebook (ipynb) sanitizer endpoint at `POST /-/api/sanitize_ipynb` allows arbitrary `data:` URIs without proper restrictions, potentially leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). The endpoint uses `bluemonday.UGCPolicy()` with `p.AllowURLSchemes(\"data\")` which permits all data URI schemes including `data:text/html`, enabling attackers to inject malicious HTML/JavaScript. Additionally, the endpoint has no authentication middleware, allowing any registered user to exploit this vulnerability.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High**\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll versions using the vulnerable endpoint\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n- **CVE ID**: (To be assigned)\n- **Entry Point**: `POST /-/api/sanitize_ipynb`\n- **Attack Vector**: Network\n- **Authentication Required**: No (only needs a registered user account)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with a registered user account can:\n\n- Send malicious HTML containing `data:text/html` URIs to the sanitization endpoint\n- Receive sanitized but attacker-controlled HTML in the response\n- Execute arbitrary JavaScript in the attacker\u0027s browser context through XSS\n- Potentially exploit other users if the sanitized output is rendered in their context\n\nThe vulnerability has higher severity because:\n\n1. No authentication required (only needs a registered user account)\n2. Unlike the safer pattern in `internal/markup/sanitizer.go:39` which uses `isSafeDataURI` to only allow safe image MIME types, this endpoint allows ALL data URIs including HTML\n3. The returned HTML can be used to craft XSS attacks\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAttacker sends a POST request to the sanitization endpoint:\n\n```http\nPOST /-/api/sanitize_ipynb HTTP/1.1\nHost: target.gogs.instance\nContent-Type: text/plain\n\n\u003ca href=\"data:text/html,\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\"\u003eclick\u003c/a\u003e\n```\n\nThe server returns the sanitized HTML with the data URI preserved:\n\n```html\n\u003ca href=\"data:text/html,\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\"\u003eclick\u003c/a\u003e\n```\n\nWhen this HTML is rendered in a browser, the JavaScript within the data URI will execute, leading to XSS.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n**File**: `internal/app/api.go:10-16`\n\n```go\nfunc ipynbSanitizer() *bluemonday.Policy {\n\tp := bluemonday.UGCPolicy()\n\tp.AllowAttrs(\"class\", \"data-prompt-number\").OnElements(\"div\")\n\tp.AllowAttrs(\"class\").OnElements(\"img\")\n\tp.AllowURLSchemes(\"data\") // \u003c-- VULNERABLE: allows all data URIs\n\treturn p\n}\n```\n\n**File**: `cmd/gogs/web.go:681-683` - No authentication middleware\n\n```go\nm.Group(\"/-\", func() {\n\tm.Get(\"/metrics\", app.MetricsFilter(), promhttp.Handler())\n\tm.Group(\"/api\", func() {\n\t\tm.Post(\"/sanitize_ipynb\", app.SanitizeIpynb()) // \u003c-- No auth middleware\n\t})\n})\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n1. **Unrestricted data URI scheme**: The code at `internal/app/api.go:14` uses `p.AllowURLSchemes(\"data\")` without any restriction, unlike the safer implementation in `internal/markup/sanitizer.go:39` which uses `AllowURLSchemeWithCustomPolicy(\"data\", isSafeDataURI)` to only allow safe image MIME types.\n\n2. **No authentication**: The endpoint at `cmd/gogs/web.go:682` does not have any authentication middleware applied, making it accessible to any registered user.\n\n3. **Insufficient validation**: The sanitization only removes dangerous tags/attributes but preserves data URIs, allowing `data:text/html` payloads to pass through.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**Option 1**: Use the same safe pattern as `internal/markup/sanitizer.go`\n\nReplace `p.AllowURLSchemes(\"data\")` with:\n\n```go\np.AllowURLSchemeWithCustomPolicy(\"data\", isSafeDataURI)\n```\n\nWhere `isSafeDataURI` is a function that only allows safe image MIME types (image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, etc.).\n\n**Option 2**: Add authentication middleware\n\nApply appropriate authentication to the endpoint:\n\n```go\nm.Post(\"/sanitize_ipynb\", middleware.signIn, app.SanitizeIpynb())\n```\n\n**Option 3**: Disable data URI scheme entirely\n\nIf data URIs are not required for ipynb sanitization:\n\n```go\n// Remove this line entirely:\n// p.AllowURLSchemes(\"data\")\n```",
"id": "GHSA-3w28-36p9-w929",
"modified": "2026-06-23T17:33:32Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T17:33:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-3w28-36p9-w929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/dd1bd9837aa196b3ed3a8ee21e5727b5d7a986a3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs\u0027s Unauthenticated Jupyter Notebook (ipynb) Sanitizer allows arbitrary data: URIs leading to XSS"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.