GHSA-3R7Q-5RXG-29MW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(),
payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength);
tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);
and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login().
login->req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350 Allocated by task 167: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 allocated 8192-byte region
Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50 Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0 iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0
iscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the declared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads exactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs how much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled buffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all.
Reject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was received, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req(): isert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done() for the ones after it. dlength <= login_req_len is allowed because the received count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding.
Once the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in: the posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot exceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is login_req_len.
Like the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in isert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a malformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login timer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an error and fails straight away.
Reproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an initiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in the BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The reported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440 behave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths, patched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal login still completes on the patched build.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:43Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nIB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received\n\nisert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in\nthe login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login\nPDU\u0027s BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,\nMAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-\u003ereq_buf, and the login code then\nreads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in\niscsi_target_locate_portal(),\n\n\tpayload_length = ntoh24(login_req-\u003edlength);\n\ttmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-\u003ereq_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);\n\nand for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from\niscsi_target_do_login().\n\nlogin-\u003ereq_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so\nan initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it,\nbefore authentication and with the length under its control:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80\n Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167\n __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60\n kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80\n iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180\n iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350\n Allocated by task 167:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370\n iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192\n allocated 8192-byte region\n\nFalsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the\nsame buffer:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80\n Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50\n Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx\n __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60\n kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80\n iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0\n iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470\n iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0\n\niscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the\ndeclared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads\nexactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs\nhow much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled\nbuffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all.\n\nReject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was\nreceived, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req():\nisert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done()\nfor the ones after it. dlength \u003c= login_req_len is allowed because the\nreceived count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding.\n\nOnce the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in:\nthe posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot\nexceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is\nlogin_req_len.\n\nLike the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in\nisert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a\nmalformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login\ntimer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an\nerror and fails straight away.\n\nReproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an\ninitiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in\nthe BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The\nreported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440\nbehave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths,\npatched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal\nlogin still completes on the patched build.",
"id": "GHSA-3r7q-5rxg-29mw",
"modified": "2026-09-18T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90413"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d9c0586af703890afe1bd0cfe641e3a3af1c32d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/228aaa620fe6a7bc8b5b21dd348b4836b1760c61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2488b5b4827e5415768afc8daf097e8eb83c98df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44fe800ec13386c88bd5b32bcd1deaa1e17535d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48812c8103071d550d9ab4a3431be5bdc52255bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71ec8bbfa4a183f1e623662f9cfbcd702e433bdb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1f3313e7b3e396e4985fea5c709477387e0a065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c345d9d0b3eefc990bb90cf565325785aab06aab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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