GHSA-3Q52-V35W-H242
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Don't free the live ring's TPA state on queue restart failure
bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() shallow copies the live RX ring into the clone:
memcpy(clone, rxr, sizeof(*rxr));
the code currently clears pointers that the clone owns (such as rx_agg_bmap), but rx_tpa and rx_tpa_idx_map are left pointing at memory of the live ring that was cloned.
If an allocation failure happens later and the err_free_tpa_info label is taken, the live ring's memory can be freed while still in use.
Fix this by initializing the clone's pointers to NULL to prevent live ring state from being freed inadvertently.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97574"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbnxt_en: Don\u0027t free the live ring\u0027s TPA state on queue restart failure\n\nbnxt_queue_mem_alloc() shallow copies the live RX ring into the clone:\n\n memcpy(clone, rxr, sizeof(*rxr));\n\nthe code currently clears pointers that the clone owns (such as\nrx_agg_bmap), but rx_tpa and rx_tpa_idx_map are left pointing at memory\nof the live ring that was cloned.\n\nIf an allocation failure happens later and the err_free_tpa_info label\nis taken, the live ring\u0027s memory can be freed while still in use.\n\nFix this by initializing the clone\u0027s pointers to NULL to prevent live\nring state from being freed inadvertently.",
"id": "GHSA-3q52-v35w-h242",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0596a7caa6fc283e142716739099c038d8714082"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ce7f36c334d723954855ac769ede2fe0e8f89c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ade95619cbfd1fc57f0f1a9a5ebdca2345a8d27"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e42287b4d38d653f7d4a47f6c29b0c01288bb050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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