GHSA-3PFP-CPF8-W9WH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix race between client_info_show() and free_client()

client_info_show() renders /proc/fs/nfsd/clients//info and walks clp->cl_sessions under clp->cl_lock to print each session's slot counts. free_client() tears down the same list without taking cl_lock, and is the only unlocked mutator of cl_sessions. A reader can observe a client mid-teardown because get_nfsdfs_clp() pins the nfs4_client but not its sessions: free_client() frees every session before calling nfsd_client_rmdir(), so an in-flight seq_file reader can follow a list_del()'d node whose ->next now holds LIST_POISON1 and take a general protection fault:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead00000000014c CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 132488 Comm: cat RIP: 0010:client_info_show+0x2bf/0x3d0 RAX: dead000000000100 Call Trace: seq_read_iter+0x12a/0x4b0 seq_read+0xf1/0x130 vfs_read+0xbf/0x350 ksys_read+0x6f/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x8b/0xcb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Detach cl_sessions onto a local reaplist under cl_lock, then free the sessions after dropping the lock. Removing entries from cl_sessions under cl_lock matches unhash_session(), and the detach-then-reap shape matches how __destroy_client() reaps cl_delegations. The sessions cannot be freed while cl_lock is held, since free_session() calls nfsd4_del_conns(), which re-acquires it.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99553"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:11Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: fix race between client_info_show() and free_client()\n\nclient_info_show() renders /proc/fs/nfsd/clients/\u003cid\u003e/info and walks\nclp-\u003ecl_sessions under clp-\u003ecl_lock to print each session\u0027s slot\ncounts.  free_client() tears down the same list without taking\ncl_lock, and is the only unlocked mutator of cl_sessions.  A reader\ncan observe a client mid-teardown because get_nfsdfs_clp() pins the\nnfs4_client but not its sessions: free_client() frees every session\nbefore calling nfsd_client_rmdir(), so an in-flight seq_file reader\ncan follow a list_del()\u0027d node whose -\u003enext now holds LIST_POISON1\nand take a general protection fault:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n        0xdead00000000014c\n  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 132488 Comm: cat\n  RIP: 0010:client_info_show+0x2bf/0x3d0\n  RAX: dead000000000100\n  Call Trace:\n   seq_read_iter+0x12a/0x4b0\n   seq_read+0xf1/0x130\n   vfs_read+0xbf/0x350\n   ksys_read+0x6f/0xf0\n   do_syscall_64+0x8b/0xcb0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nDetach cl_sessions onto a local reaplist under cl_lock, then free the\nsessions after dropping the lock.  Removing entries from cl_sessions\nunder cl_lock matches unhash_session(), and the detach-then-reap shape\nmatches how __destroy_client() reaps cl_delegations.  The sessions\ncannot be freed while cl_lock is held, since free_session() calls\nnfsd4_del_conns(), which re-acquires it.",
  "id": "GHSA-3pfp-cpf8-w9wh",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99553"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f6a52f076d4ebbd91868b06e9546ada829cf101"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee62dc03a69ee57855de35da1a8ab53b51d30b32"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f43a5d7b665cf04199a3e8ea0dddc9e2dbd5ada6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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