GHSA-3PF7-5297-2FFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-14 09:31The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 5.7.3 via the booking[id] and cart[id] parameters on the steps__reload_booking_form_summary_panel and steps__start public routes (reachable through wp_ajax_nopriv_latepoint_route_call). This is due to OsStepsHelper::set_required_objects() feeding raw request parameters into set_booking_object() and set_cart_object(), which call OsModel::set_data() and load an arbitrary booking or cart row by primary key with no ownership check — the ownership guard the vendor added for the earlier disclosure lives only inside OsStepsHelper::load_step() and does not cover the sibling routes or cart[id] at all. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential booking / cart identifiers and read other customers' appointment details (service name, agent, date/time, duration, price breakdown, status) and other shoppers' pending checkout contents directly from the JSON responses.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T08:17:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Appointment Booking Plugin \u2013 LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 5.7.3 via the `booking[id]` and `cart[id]` parameters on the `steps__reload_booking_form_summary_panel` and `steps__start` public routes (reachable through wp_ajax_nopriv_latepoint_route_call). This is due to `OsStepsHelper::set_required_objects()` feeding raw request parameters into `set_booking_object()` and `set_cart_object()`, which call `OsModel::set_data()` and load an arbitrary booking or cart row by primary key with no ownership check \u2014 the ownership guard the vendor added for the earlier disclosure lives only inside `OsStepsHelper::load_step()` and does not cover the sibling routes or `cart[id]` at all. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential booking / cart identifiers and read other customers\u0027 appointment details (service name, agent, date/time, duration, price breakdown, status) and other shoppers\u0027 pending checkout contents directly from the JSON responses.",
"id": "GHSA-3pf7-5297-2ffv",
"modified": "2026-10-14T09:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-10-14T09:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/latepoint.php#L1072"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/lib/controllers/steps_controller.php#L145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/lib/controllers/steps_controller.php#L290"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/lib/helpers/steps_helper.php#L1232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/lib/helpers/steps_helper.php#L234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/lib/helpers/steps_helper.php#L3228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.3/lib/models/model.php#L580"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3728691%40latepoint\u0026new=3728691%40latepoint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2f13d1ac-d1b4-4802-bee2-3622e84d7482?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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